On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework by Vasilev, Aleksandar
scottish institute for research in economics 
 
 
 
 
 
SIRE DISCUSSION PAPER 
SIRE-DP-2013-84 
 
 
On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats 
in a Real-Business-Cycle framework 
  
 
Aleksandar Vasilev 
University of Glasgow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.sire.ac.uk 
On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats
in a Real-Business-Cycle framework
Aleksandar Vasilev∗
September 22, 2013
Abstract
This paper studies the wasteful effect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the
link between rent-seeking behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector
wage bill, which is taken to represent the rent component. In particular, public offi-
cials are modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. The
rent-seeking extraction technology in the government administration is modeled as in
Murphy et al. (1991) and incorporated in an otherwise standard Real-Business-Cycle
(RBC) framework with public sector. The model is calibrated to German data for the
period 1970-2007. The main findings are: (i) Due to the existence of a significant pub-
lic sector wage premium and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount
of working time is spent rent-seeking, which in turn leads to significant losses in terms
of output; (ii) The measures for the rent-seeking cost obtained from the model for the
major EU countries are highly-correlated to indices of bureaucratic inefficiency; (iii)
Under the optimal fiscal policy regime,steady-state rent-seeking is smaller relative to
the exogenous policy case, as the government chooses a higher public wage premium,
but sets a much lower public employment, thus achieving a decrease in rent-seeking.
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1 Introduction
The social cost of rent-seeking and administrative corruption in Europe can cause a sig-
nificant loss for the economy, as argued in Rose-Akerman (1999). Rent-seeking behavior,
however, can take many forms and in many instances corruption schemes are not obvious.
In particular, this paper focuses on the non-productive activities that occur inside public ad-
ministration and models them in a dynamic general-equilibrium setting. This is achieved by
adding public employment and rent-seeking by government officials to an otherwise standard
RBC model. As in Wallenius and Prescott (2011), public sector labor choice is shown to be
important not only for fiscal policy, but also for political economy issues. The framework in
this paper is then used to generate a theory-based measure for the cost of the waste imposed
on the economy, and proceeds to compare and contrast it with the value obtained from the
optimal fiscal policy case.
In line with Eliott (1997), Goel and Nelson (1998), and Persson and Tabellini (2000, p.8.),
the focus in this paper will be on particular types of government expenditure, namely spend-
ing on wages, and its potential to produce rent-seeking behavior. In particular, the sharp
increase in public sector employment observed in EU member states in the post-WWII era,
together with the existence of a significant public wage premium, could be driven by the
tendency for bureaucracy to self-breed and expand independently. Borcherding (1977) was
the first to provide some evidence for such a hypothesis by demonstrating that only half of
the increase in real government spending can be rationalized with changes in relative prices,
or demand factors such as increase in real income, and population growth. In addition,
LaPalombara (1994) finds that the size of government budget relative to output is positively
correlated with levels of corruption (p.338).
Importantly, this bloating process in the administration and the subsequent expansion of
the public sector wage bill should raise concerns in policy makers, since larger governments
tend to lose efficiency progressively with size, an issue first expressed in Parkinson (1962).
Furthermore, a classic study by von Mises (1944) provides a possible justification for this
claim by elaborating on some of the important differences between a bureaucrat and a private
sector worker. First, labor productivity in the public sector is difficult to measure. Moreover,
a quantity corresponding to government production is also hard to define. This is driven by
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the fact that public services are to a great extent composed of non-market output. Lastly, a
government employee often comes into office through the political system - by election or by
appointment of other bureaucrats, usually from the same party. Therefore, a bureaucrat is
both an employer and an employee. Once organized, bureaucrats concentrate on increasing
in numbers, keeping the status quo, and resisting change.1
In the literature on bureaucracy, the studies by von Mises (1944), Parkinson (1957), Niskanen
(1971), Warwick (1975), Tullock (1976) and Tinbergen (1985) all focus on the strong com-
petition for advancement within bureaus and the inter-unit conflicts. In particular, as noted
in Box (2004), ”public sector bureaucrats want their agencies to grow so that their status
and freedom to act are increased,” and thus each government official has a vested interest in
promotion. Furthermore, the contemporary bureaucrat is not the ideal type envisioned and
described in Weber (1963), the impartial official and the competent professional who shows
a strong ethos for working in the public administration,2 but rather a self-interested individ-
ual. In particular, Peter (1969) describes the process employed by a government worker to
obtain promotions as ”acquiring a pull” (p.48). This can occur when the employee finds a
patron, a person superior in the hierarchy, who can help with the employee’s promotion.3 In
some instances, multiple patrons may be chosen, producing a network effect, as individual
patrons talk to one another about the employee’s career prospects and advancement. In his
monograph, Klitgaard (1991) pays particular attention to bureaucratic corruption, and in-
vestigates different cases that result from bureaucratic employment. In particular, his study
argues that administrative corruption, and often the use of patronage allow bureaucrats to
supplement salaries with public funds.
In an important study, Rose-Akerman (1999) also argues that corruption, or rent-seeking
behavior, is embedded in the hierarchical structure of public administration. For example,
subordinates in the administration are treated as ”family,” and some of the gains obtained
by their superiors through rent-seeking are shared with staff members, who are lower in the
hierarchy. Thus, Rose-Akerman (1978) not only distinguishes between high-level and low-
1Often, the expansion in bureaucracy is justified by bureaucrats themselves, who claim there is an in-
crease in the perceived demand for public services and thus there is need for more regulation, hence larger
administration.
2After all, Fry (1989) reminds that ”Weber’s ideal type is not a description of reality.” (p. 21)
3Another author who discusses the patronage system is Gortner (1977).
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level bureaucrats, but also emphasizes inter-official competition.4 In addition, as observed in
Parkinson (1957), officials can increase and multiply by making work for each other through
the redundancy of repetitive tasks and overlapping authorities and responsibilities. In this
sense, as in McKenzie and Tullock (1978) and Reisman (1990), public professionals can be
regarded as self-interested maximizers of their position in a bureaucratic world, who pursue
career advancement, financial security, and try to use the organization where they work to
serve their personal interests. In a more recent study, Lambsdorff (2007) claims that if cor-
ruption involves a rent-seeking government whose members attempt to enrich themselves,
then the size of the government itself should be significantly decreased (p.4). Similar views
are presented in Rose-Akerman (1978), who associates bureaucratic corruption with bloated
agency budgets.5
Very few economists, with the notable exception of Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Tul-
lock (1965), and Niskanen (1971), have focused on the presence of a large bureaucracy and
provided evidence of its importance in the macroeconomic context. In addition, a very small
economic literature exists on the internal organization of the state and the incentives of gov-
ernment bureaucracy, e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), Acemoglu (2005), and Becker and
Mulligan (2003). Guriev (2004), Dixit (2006, 2010), and Dodlova (2013) also point out to
the multi-tier structure of the government bureaucracy, the principal-bureaucrat-agent hier-
archy, as the main culprit for state inefficiency, due to the agency problem generated within
such an organizational arrangement. More specifically, elected politicians (agents) need to
elect experts (bureaucrats) to implement policies in the interest of the citizens (principal).
Thus, as argued in Tirole (1994) and Aghion and Tirole (1997), bureaucrats possess the real
authority in the government, as they have an ”effective control over decisions” (even though
they don’t have the ”formal authority”). In addition, Niskanen (1971), Bendor et al. (1985),
and Horn (1995) argue that bureaucrats use their superior information when the budget is
decided to inflate the costs of labor input.6
The focus in those studies also fall on the emergence of inefficient states, where the in-
efficiency is measured in terms of extracted rents and the excessive spending on wages of
4Promotions and prizes in bureaucracy will also be treated as rent-seeking activities in the model.
5Bhagwati (1982) names the process ”internal corruption,” and views rent-seeking activities as ”directly
unproductive.”
6For literature on the incentives of bureaucrats, see Laffont (2000), and Laffont and Martimort (2002).
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bureaucrats. Gregory and Lazarev (2003) and Acemoglu et al. (2007) also documents cases
of overemployment of bureaucrats to boost encumbant’s party’s votes.7 Furthermore, gov-
ernment workers could be compensated with higher wages, as a favor by policymakers in
exchange of bureaucrats’ loyalty, or an an efficiency wage aiming to solve monitoring prob-
lems (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000). Makris (2006) also emphasizes the importance of the
high cost of production of government services for the budget, while Migue and Belanger
(1974) argue that bureaucrats oversupply public services, while at the same time enjoying
an excessive budget, the size of which is unrelated to their labor productivity.8 The latter
could be rationalized, at least partially, with the moral hazard problem in the government
employment sector, as bureaucrats have a better information about the level of the effort
exerted, relative to the superiors.9
Despite being a possibly better description of the internal organization of the state and
the incentives of the bureaucracy, the modeling choice in those partial-equilibrium setups
cannot be easily translated and adopted in general equilibrium. Possible extensions of the
work in this chapter along those lines is left for future research, as it does not serve our
current purpose of quantifying the cost of rent seeking for the aggregate economic activity.
This chapter would therefore present an alternative channel used by bureaucrats to rent-seek
and lobby for government funds.10 Bureaucracy in the setup will be implicitly modeled as
a collection of competing bureaus, as in Niskanen (1971): every bureaucrat, in each bureau,
would want to control more and more subordinates. In addition, the bureaucrat’s preference
for power and prestige will bring utility through higher labor income, and thus higher con-
sumption.
7Egorov and Sonin (2009) point out that often policy makers would prefer a loyal bureaucrat to a capable
one.
8Roett (1999) points out that there is a public perception that public sector workers are overpaid and
underworked.
9See Dewatripont et al. (1999), Francois (2000), Dixit (2002), Prendergast (2002) and Besley and
Ghatak (2005) for the implications of moral hazard in government non-profit organizations. In addition,
Tarschys (1975) and Wildavsky (1974) argue that government bureaucracies develop internal pressures for
self-aggrandizement and expansion. Lastly, interaction among bureaucrats for budget appropriation are
discussed in Miller and Moe (1983), Moe (1997), Bendor et al. (1985), Bos (2001), and Casas-Pardo and
Puchades-Navarro (2001).
10Indeed, most of government consumption spending is on the wage bill for staff compensation (OECD
1982).
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To illustrate the processes taking place within public administration, the model setup in
this paper incorporates a symmetric non-cooperative game that is played among govern-
ment bureaucrats themselves to increase individual income at the expense of the other pub-
lic officials earnings.11 The symmetric rent-seeking process is modeled as in Murphy et al.
(1991)12: each individual allocates time optimally on both productive activities and rent-
seeking. Additionally, the interaction between agents in the public sector generates strategic
complementarities, as individual rent-seeking is positively related to opponents’ choice of
rent-seeking. As in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1993, 1996), rent-seeking increases one’s
own capacity and at the same time decreases others’ capacity level. In reality, as pointed
out in Tinbergen (1985), this correspond to public employees redistributing residual bureau
funds, expropriating vacation money (Mieczkowski 1984, p. 164), or applying bonus schemes
methodology according to rank and experience. The benefit from engaging in rent-seeking
comes at the expense of a cost incurred, which is measured in terms of time, similar to the
approach used in Angelopoulos et al. (2009).
The value-added of this paper is the focus on the link between the rent-seeking behavior
in bureaucracy and the government wage bill, and the resulting cost imposed on the econ-
omy as a result of the non-productive activities taking place in the public sector. Another
novelty here is that rent-seeking occurs in a non-competitive labor market, the public sector
one, where wage rate is set above private sector pay. This stimulates entry of labor in the
sector, and as a result, public employment eventually becomes too high. In particular, both
the high public wage and employment stimulate rent-seeking by generating a positive benefit
of engaging in wasteful activities. In turn, a higher wage bill requires higher tax rates to
finance government spending. In the private sector, high taxes reduce incentives to supply
11Note that when a large number of bureaucrats attempt to maximize identical objective functions, which
are subject to the same set of constraints, this results in a theory covering bureaucracy as a whole, as was
first attempted in Niskanen (1971).
12An incomplete list of the extraction literature that uses rent-seeking mechanism is: Krueger (1974),
Posner (1974, 1975), Tullock (1975, 1980), Congleton (1980), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), Corcoran
and Karels (1985), Appelbaum and Katz (1987), Hillman and Riley (1989), Murphy et al. (1991, 1993),
Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992), Nitzan (1994), Tirole (1986), Khan and Sundaran (2000), Mohtadi and
Roe (1998, 2003) and Mauro (2004). Park et al. (2005) for similar setups in which rent-seekers compete with
each other for fiscal favors. For surveys of the literature of rent-seeking see Drazen (2000, Ch.11), Persson
and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 14.4) and Mueller (2003).
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labor and accumulate capital, and decrease consumption and output. Thus rent-seeking has
a negative impact on the economy, and this paper attempts to quantify the loss for the
economy in a general-equilibrium framework.
The study in this paper is also complementary to Park et. al (2005), and Angelopoulos
et al. (2009, 2011), who all address rent-seeking issues using DSGE models.13 Their fo-
cus, however, falls on problems of tax collection and/or protection of property rights, this
study concentrates on the inefficiencies on the government spending side, and the wage bill
in particular. In addition, earlier studies consider exogenous policy only, and focus on the
non-cooperative Nash (1953) solution of the rent-seeking game, while only briefly discussing
the existence (and attainability) of other subgame-perfect equilibria.14
Lastly, the rent-seeking process in the public sector can be also viewed as a ”coordination
failure” problem, as first described in Cooper and John (1988) and Cooper (1999). There
is a bad equilibrium, from the non-cooperative game, but also a good equilibrium, where
all agents coordinate on the zero rent-seeking. A positive value of rent-seeking time chosen
by bureaucrats is socially costly, as the return comes not from productive effort, but rather
from the distribution of public funds. At the same time, the positive amount of time dedi-
cated to opportunistic activities is an efficient outcome from an individual worker’s point of
view, as all agents are fully rational and maximize their utility levels. Thus, in equilibrium,
individual bureaucratic rent-seeking efforts will adjust to the point where the value of ad-
ditional resources spent per bureaucrat equals the benefit that accrues to that individual.15
Moreover, the higher the level of output, the higher the tax revenue, and thus the larger
the pie available for redistribution.This paper finds non-trivial welfare gains of cooperation
in the exogenous policy case, which is not considered in previous studies. In addition, a
comparative statics exercise is performed to show that significant gains can be realized when
the economy moves to a steady-state in which wages are equalized across sectors, and thus
rent-seeking is brought down to zero.
13Park et al. (2004), Economides et al. (2007) and Angelopoulos and Economides (2008) address rent-
seeking in models with electoral uncertainty.
14This infinitely-repeated game can generate a very rich class of subgame-perfect equilibria, which are all
sustainable (Mas-Colell et al. 1995).
15Note that the first-best solution (the jointly optimal level) in the model results in zero rent-seeking.
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Next, using the model-generated measure, rent-seeking across the EU-12 is compared to
indices of institutional quality in the government sector. Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011)
use the ICRG index as a proxy for rent-seeking, while this paper considers additional indi-
cators that specifically focus on public administration quality. In general, rent-seeking from
the government budget is expected to be associated with low quality of government, high
corruption, and heavy bureaucratization.16
The study then proceeds to discuss the optimal fiscal policy, where not only tax rates,
but also different categories of government spending, as well as rent-seeking (from the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium) are optimally chosen by a benevolent Ramsey planner. Due
to rent-seeking, public investment is lower, and government consumption (wage bill) is too
high. Furthermore, the rent-seeking estimates can be evaluated against findings from studies
using static models with rent-seeking of tariff revenues, monopoly profits, and regulations,
as well as the costs computed in Angelopoulos et al. (2009) in a general-equilibrium frame-
work. Thus, using tools of modern dynamic economics, the study in this paper contributes
to the understanding of the wasteful effect of bureaucracy for the economy. It also provides
an integrated framework to address public economics and political economy issues, such as
public sector labor supply in a non-competitive market, as well as the optimal production
and provision of congestible government services.
The main findings of the study are that: (i) Due to the existence of a significant public
sector wage premium and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount of work-
ing time is spent rent-seeking, which in turn leads to significant losses in terms of output; (ii)
The measures for the rent-seeking cost obtained from the model for the major EU countries
are highly-correlated to indices of bureaucratic inefficiency; (iii) Under the optimal fiscal
policy regime, and with congestible public goods, steady-state rent-seeking is significantly
smaller relative to the exogenous policy case; (iv) In addition to the zero capital tax rate,
and the higher labor tax rate, the benevolent government planner invests more in public
capital, chooses a higher public wage premium, but sets a much lower public employment,
and thus achieves a decrease in the level of rent-seeking relative to the value obtained in the
16The ICRG index from the IRIS dataset has been used in, among others, Knack and Kiefer (1995), Barro
(1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrick (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Fisman and Gatti (2002) and
Persson et al. (2003).
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exogenous case.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model setup in the context of
the relevant literature. Section 3 explains the data used and model calibration. Section 4
solves for the steady-state, and section 5 calculates the cost of rent-seeking on the economy;
Section 6 presents the model solution procedure, discusses the effect of technology shocks
and the impulse responses of variables. Section 7 discusses the optimal policy (Ramsey)
framework and solves for the steady-state. Section 8 presents the optimal reaction of fiscal
policy instruments to technology shocks, and compares and contrasts it to the exogenous
policy case. Section 9 acknowledges the limitations of the study, and Section 10 concludes.
2 Model Setup
2.1 Description of the model
There are Nt households, as well as a representative firm. Each household owns physi-
cal capital and labor, which it supplies to the firm. Time can be spent working in the
private and/or public sector, rent-seeking, or dedicated to leisure. Working in the govern-
ment sector imposes an additional convex transaction cost, which decreases leisure time.
The perfectly-competitive firm produces output using labor and capital. The government
produces utility-enhancing labor-intensive public services and uses tax revenues from con-
sumption expenditure, labor and capital income to finance: (1) government transfers, (2)
government investment, and (3) public wage bill.
The public sector wage in this paper is modeled as featuring a time-variant mark-up over the
private sector wage. Next, individual hours supplied in the public sector can be augmented
by using rent-seeking time, and the coefficient of capacity utilization positively depends on
one’s own rent-seeking time and negatively related to other households’ rent-seeking time.
This is similar to the study by Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011), in which households were
able to extract part of the tax revenues, or output directly, respectively. In this paper the re-
source extraction is a little more sophisticated, as public wages are financed from government
tax revenues, and therefore government resources are only indirectly expropriated.
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2.2 Households
There are Nt representative households in the model economy, who are infinitely-lived.
17
There is no population growth. As in Baxter and King (1993), household h maximizes the
following expected utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cpht , S
g
t , L
h
t ), (2.2.1)
where E0 is the expectation operator as of period 0; C
ph
t , S
g
t and L
h
t are household’s private
consumption, per household consumption of government services, and leisure enjoyed by
household h at time t, respectively. The parameter β is the discount factor, 0 < β < 1. The
instantaneous utility function U(., ., .) is increasing in each argument and satisfies the Inada
conditions. The particular functional form for instantaneous utility used is as follows:
U(Cpht , S
g
t , L
h
t ) = ψ1
(Cpht )
(1−σc)
1− σc + ψ2
(Lht )
(1−σl)
1− σl + ψ3
(Sgt )
1−σs
1− σs (2.2.2)
where σc, σl, σs > 0 are the curvature parameters of private consumption, leisure, and
government services utility component. Parameters ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 are the weight attached to
private consumption, leisure and public services components in utility, respectively, where
0 < ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 < 1, and ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3 = 1.
Total time available to each household is split between work, Nht , rent-seeking in the public
sector, RSht , and leisure, L
h
t , Households can supply hours of work in the public sector, N
gh
t ,
in the private one, Npht , with N
h
t = N
ph
t + N
gh
t . Given a positive public sector wage, every
household will optimally choose to supply a positive amount of hours in the public sector.
Thus, the model allows everyone to engage in public sector rent-seeking.
In addition, it will be assumed that the household incurs a quadratic transaction cost from
government work, ϕ(N ght )
2, where ϕ > 0. The modeling choice tries to capture some of the
market imperfections existing in the public sector labor markets, such as the high union-
ization and the monopsony situation, as well as to help the model accommodate different
wage rates in the two sectors, as well as public hours labor choice in the framework. This
assumption is also in line with evidence from case studies in Box (2004), which shows that
17This number is countably infinite, and the households could be thought of being uniformly distributed
on the [0, 1] interval.
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working in the public sector is different from working in the private sector, as the two sectors
operate under different institutional settings.
In the private sector, efficiency level is constant and for convenience will be normalized to
unity, while utilization rate in the public sector can vary because of the rent-seeking. Similar
to the approach adopted in Cho and Cooley (1994), and Hayashi and Prescott (2007), in
this framework contracted and effective public hours enter the household’s utility function
through different functional forms. The wage rates per efficiency unit of labor in the private
and the public sector are denoted by wpt and w
g
t , respectively. In addition, public wage rate
will carry a premium over the private wage rate, which is allowed to vary over time. As
pointed out in Bellante and Jackson (1979), the overpayment of public employees could be
regarded as rent as it is ”a pay level higher necessary to attract the requisite quality and
quantity of labor in the public sector (p. 248), and thus can be viewed as an efficiency wage.18
Next, after joining the public sector, rent-seeking occurs, as it brings a positive benefit
from engaging in opportunistic behavior. The form of the corruption is a non-transaction
type, and can be interpreted as an abuse of power for personal advantage, or putting one’s
own interests first in the performance of a public duty. In particular, by using his or her own
rent-seeking time, an individual’s public sector labor income can be augmented by increas-
ing the effective hours worked in the government: By supplying N ght contract hours in the
public sector, and spending RSht hours on rent-seeking, each households generates
RSht
RSt
N ght of
”efficiency units of labor,” as in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1993, 1996), hence total public
sector labor income becomes wgt
RSht
RSt
N ght .
19 At the same time, predatory behavior decreases
the capacity utilization of labor of the other workers in the public sector. Note that each
household is atomistic, so it takes the aggregate quantity of rent-seeking RSt as given. (In
18This is in line with the evidence that public sector employees are more skilled than those in the private
sector. On the other hand, Beaumont (1980) argues that public unions usually maintain that ”a public
employer should be the best employer, that its wage policy should be based on the highest rates being paid
for comparable work in the private sector” (p. 32). In addition, Bender (1998, 2003) provides empirical
support that part of the public wage premium is due to political economy factors, e.g., public employees
vote more often than the average private sector worker (Jensen et al. 2009).
19Thus RS
h
RS can be interpreted as a shift parameter of the rent-seeking extraction technology. As in
Grossman (2002), this technology representation is a useful short-cut to model rent-seeking. In addition,
note that at the aggregate level, the efficiency issues disappears, as
∑
h
RSh
RS N
gh =
∑
h
RS
RSN
gh = Ng by first
applying the symmetry, and then aggregating over households.
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equilibrium, RSt =
∑
hRS
h
t .) Thus, even though total public employment is exogenous,
20
the individual public hours are endogenous.
As in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1993, 1996), it is assumed that each household cares about
effective hours of work only. Thus, the time constraint that each household faces in each
period (in efficiency terms) is as follows:
Npht +
RSht
RSt
N ght + ϕ(N
gh
t )
2 +RSht + L
h
t = 1. (2.2.3)
The rent-seeking technology described is a special case of a standard symmetric contestable
prize function used in the literature.21 This approach models rent-seeking as an optimal
choice made by each government bureaucrat. In addition, the size of the total pie available
to government workers will be endogenously determined, as each bureaucrat chooses indi-
vidual public hours optimally. Thus each official has an incentive to choose the optimal size
of their effective ”slice.” The only modeling difference in this paper from the earlier general-
equilibrium studies on rent-seeking, e.g. Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011), is that the cost
of resources spent on influencing the probability of winning,
RSht
RSt
, is measured in terms of
time and thus in utility of leisure terms instead of output/income directly. For practical
purposes, the specification used in the current model setup can also be interpreted as an
auction in which competing bureaus lobby for a larger share of the contestable transfer, and
the endogenous sharing rule defines the rent-seeking technology. Moreover, a larger share of
the pie means higher effective public hours, which can be associated with promotion in the
hierarchical structure, higher prestige, more subordinates, more power by entrenchment in
an organization and thus the achievement of security and convenience.
In addition to the labor income received, each household saves by investing in private capital
Iht . As an owner of capital, the household receives interest income rtK
ph
t from renting the
capital to the firms; rt is the return to physical capital and K
ph
t denotes physical capital
20The mechanism has also empirical foundations: as established in Staaf (1977), in the US public education
sector, the supervisory salaries are correlated with the number of subordinates (teachers in the district).
21An inexhaustive list of studies includes Krueger (1974), Posner (1974, 1975), Tullock (1975, 1980),
Congleton (1980), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), Corcoran and Karels (1985), Appelbaum and Katz
(1987), Hillman and Riley (1989), Castrillo and Verdier (1992), Nitzan (1994) and Khan and Sundaran
(2000). For an extensive review of ”extraction technologies” the interested reader should consult Mueller
(2003) Ch. 15.
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stock in the beginning of period t.
The household’s physical capital evolves according to the following law of motion
Kpht+1 = I
h
t + (1− δp)Kpht , (2.2.4)
where 0 < δp < 1 is the depreciation rate of private physical capital.
Finally, consumers are owners of the firms in the economy, and receive equal share of the
profit (Πht ) in the form of dividends. The budget constraint for each household is
Cpht + I
h
t ≤ (1− τ lt )
[
wptN
ph
t + w
g
t
RSht
RSt
N ght
]
+ (1− τ kt )rtKpht + Πht +Gtht , (2.2.5)
where τ lt , τ
k
t are the proportional tax rates on labor and capital income, respectively, and
Gtht denotes the level of per household lump-sum government transfer.
Each household h acts competitively by taking prices {wpt , wgt , rt}∞t=0, tax rates {τ lt , τ kt } and
policy variables {Git, Sgt , Gtt, Kgt+1}∞t=0 as given, it chooses allocations {Cpht , Npht , N ght , RSht , Iht ,
Kht+1}∞t=0 to maximize Equation (2.2.1) subject to Equations (2.2.2)-(2.2.5), and the initial
condition for physical and public capital stocks {Kph0 , Kg0}.
The optimality conditions from the household’s problem, together with the transversality
condition (TVC) for the private physical capital stock, are as follows:22
Cpht :
ψ1
[Cpht ]
σc
= Λt (2.2.6)
Kpht+1 : Λt = βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)
]
(2.2.7)
Npht :
ψ2
(Lt)σl
= Λt(1− τ lt )wpt (2.2.8)
N ght :
ψ2
(Lt)σl
[
RSht
RSt
+ 2ϕN ght
]
= Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
RSht
RSt
(2.2.9)
RSht :
ψ2
(Lt)σl
[
1 +
N ght
RSt
]
= Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
N ght
RSt
(2.2.10)
22Detailed derivations in Appendix 11.1.2.
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lim
t→∞
βtΛtK
ph
t+1 = 0, (2.2.11)
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint. The household
equates marginal utility from consumption with the marginal cost imposed on its budget.
Next, the Euler equation describes the optimal capital accumulation rule, and implicitly
characterizes the optimal consumption allocations chosen in any two neighboring periods.
Private hours are chosen so that the disutility of an hour work in the private sector at the
margin equals the after-tax return to labor. The disutility of an hour of rent-seeking time
equals the marginal increase in after-tax public sector labor income. At the margin, the
benefit of engaging in rent-seeking equals the utility cost of doing so. The last expressions,
(2.1.11), is the so-called ”transversality condition” (TVC), imposed to ensure that the value
of the private physical capital that remains after the optimization horizon is zero. This
boundary conditions guarantees that the model equilibrium is well-defined by ruling out
explosive solution paths.
Divide (2.2.9) by (2.2.8), and impose symmetry (hence RSht = RSt, N
gh
t = N
g
t ) to obtain
1 + 2ϕN gt =
wgt
wpt
. (2.2.12)
Eq. (2.2.12) is a typical labor supply relationship, and characterized in this framework by a
positive relationship between total public hours and the public/private wage ratio.23 Next,
divide (2.2.10) by (2.2.8) to obtain
wgtN
gh
t
wptRSt
= 1 +
N ght
RSt
. (2.2.13)
After some rearrangement, and by imposing symmetry once again, it can be shown that
RSt =
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
N gt . (2.2.14)
Optimality condition (2.2.15) is new in the literature on rent-seeking. As seen from above,
rent-seeking time is a product of public employment, N gt , and the net wage premium,
wgt
wpt
−1.
In other words, the corruption problem in this framework could be split into two parts: the
high public employment (”extensive margin”), and the high public wage premium (”intensive
23Alternatively, the equation can be interpreted as a ”wage curve” equation, similar to the one described
in Blanchflower and Oswald (1996).
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margin”).24 Therefore, Eq. (2.2.14) suggests that cuts in the public wage bill are important
for curbing the size of the contestable prize and thus effectively restraining the rent-seeking
behavior of government bureaucrats.25
2.3 Firms
There is also a representative private firm. It produces a homogeneous final product using a
production function that requires physical capital, Kt and labor hours H
p
t . The production
function is as follows:
Yt = At(N
p
t )
α(Kpt )
1−α, (2.3.1)
where At measures the total factor productivity in period t; 0 < α, (1 − α) < 1 are the
productivity of labor and private physical capital, respectively.
The representative firm acts competitively by taking prices {wpt , wgt , rt}∞t=0 and policy vari-
ables {τ kt , τ lt , Git, Gtt, Kgt }∞t=0 as given. Accordingly, Kpt , and Npt are chosen every period to
maximize static aggregate profit,
Πt = At(N
p
t )
α(Kpt )
1−α − rtKpt − wptNpt . (2.3.2)
In equilibrium, capital and labor receive their marginal products, i.e.26
rt = (1− α) Yt
Kpt
, (2.3.3)
wpt = α
Yt
Npt
. (2.3.4)
Hence, equilibrium per-period profits are zero.
2.4 Government
Government invests in capital, Git, which is used in the provision of the utility-enhancing
government services. In addition, government hires labor N gt at a wage level w
g
t to produce
24Hence RSt = 0 when w
p
t = w
g
t , and/or N
g
t = 0.
25Another instance when equilibrium rent-seeking is zero, is when all households decide to play the co-
operative solution. The government can use a ”coordination device,” e.g. by providing a forum for free
exchange of information that would ultimately induce workers to cooperate on the ”good equilibrium.”
26For a detailed derivation, see Appendix 11.1.1.
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public consumption goods and distributes transfers Gtt(≡
∑
hG
th). The production function
for public consumption is as in Cavallo (2005), Linnemann (2009) and Economides et al.
(2011):
Sgt = (N
g
t )
γ(Kgt )
(1−γ), (2.4.1)
where 0 < γ < 1 is the share of public employment. Since the household takes the level of
government services as given, in competitive equilibrium there will be externalities arising
from the presence of public employment and investment in the government services produc-
tion function: More hours in the public sector generate more government services (a higher
level of the public good available for public consumption), which directly increase utility. In
addition, holding all else equal, an increase in public employment raises welfare indirectly
by increasing the after-tax public sector labor income, and hence consumption. Lastly, more
hours spent in the public sector decrease the amount of leisure the household can enjoy in
a certain period (and also increase rent-seeking), and thus lower welfare. The quantitative
effect will be determined by the value of the curvature parameter σs in the household’s utility
function. Therefore, in the general case it is unclear ex ante whether public employment
creates a positive or a negative externality in the economy.27
Total government expenditure, Gtt + G
i
t + w
g
tH
g
t , is financed by levying proportional taxes
on capital and labor income. Thus, the government budget constraint is as follows:
Gtt +G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t = τ
k
t rtK
p
t + τ
l
t
[
wptN
p
t + w
g
tN
g
t
]
. (2.4.2)
Next, the law for government capital accumulation is as follows:
Kgt+1 = G
i
t + (1− δg)Kgt , (2.4.3)
where 0 < δg < 1 is the depreciation rate of public capital.
Government takes market prices {wpt , rt}∞t=0 and allocations {Npt , N gt , Kpt }∞t=0 as given. Fi-
nally, only four of the five policy instruments, {τ lt , τ kt , wgt , Git, Gtt}∞t=0, can be exogenously set.
Government investment share in output, Giyt =
Git
Yt
, as well as the two tax rates {τ lt , τ kt }
will be fixed to their corresponding data average in all time periods; Thus, the level of gov-
ernment investment will react to private output. Note that public capital stock series will
27Ex post, in the optimal policy framework, it will be shown that public hours create a negative externality.
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be residually determined from a given initial stock, and public investment sequence. Next,
government transfers {Gtt}∞t=0 will be set to match the employment ratio in data. Lastly,
the public wage rate will be determined residually to ensure that the government budget
constraint is satisfied in every period.
In other words, the government controls the labor demand in the public sector, and fac-
ing a supply schedule for labor services in the government sector, sets the price of labor to
clear the market. Despite the market-clearing property in this market, however, the situa-
tion is one of imperfect competition, as the price of labor is decoupled from the marginal
productivity in the public sector and, rather, determined by budgetary considerations. In a
sense, public sector labor markets will operate inside the production possibilities frontier.
2.5 Stochastic processes for the policy variables
Total factor productivity, At, will be assumed to follow AR(1) processes in logs, in particular
lnAt+1 = (1− ρa) lnA0 + ρa lnAt + at+1, (2.5.1)
where A0 = A > 0 is steady-state level value of the total factor productivity process,
0 < ρa < 1 is the first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and at ∼ iidN(0, σ2a) are
random shocks to the total factor productivity progress. Hence, the innovations at represent
unexpected changes in total factor productivity process.
2.6 Symmetric Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
Given the paths of the policy instruments {Git, Gtt}∞t=0, the exogenous process followed by
total factor productivity, {At}∞t=0, and initial conditions for the state variables {A0, Kph0 , Kg0},
a symmetric decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) is defined to be a sequence of
allocations {Cpht , Npht , N ght , RSht , Iht , Kpht+1, Kgt+1}∞t=0, ∀h, prices {rt, wpt , wgt }∞t=0 and the tax
rates {τ kt , τ lt} so that (i) all households maximize utility; (ii) firms maximize profits; (iii) the
government budget constraint is satisfied in each time period, and (iv) all markets clear.28
28The symmetric DCE system of equations for the general case, and the steady-state system is presented
in Appendices 11.2 and 11.3.
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3 Data and model calibration
The model in this paper is calibrated to German data at annual frequency. The choice of
the particular economy was made based on the large public employment share, as well as
the significant public wage premium observed in this country. Since there is no EU-wide
fiscal authority, an individual country was chosen, instead of calibrating the model for the
EU Area as a whole. In addition, payment in the public sector in the model is determined
not by marginal productivity of labor, but rather by factors outside the model.
The paper follows the methodology used in Kydland and Prescott (1982), as it is the stan-
dard approach in the literature. Both the data set and steady-state DCE relationships of
the models will be used to set the parameter values, in order to replicate relevant long-run
moments of the reference economy for the question investigated in this paper.
3.1 Model-consistent German data
Due to data limitations, the model calibrated for Germany will be for the period 1970-2007
only, while the sub-period 1970-91 covers West Germany only.29 For Germany, data on real
output per capita, household consumption per capita, government transfers and population
was taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistical database was used to extract
the long-term interest rate on 10-year generic bonds, CPI inflation, average annual earnings
in the private and public sector, average hours, private, public and total employment in
Germany. Investment and capital stock series were obtained from the EU Klems database
(2009). The German average annual real public compensation per employee was estimated
by dividing the real government wage bill (OECD 2011) by the number of public employees.
3.2 Calibrating model parameters to the German data
In the German data, the average public/private employment ratio over the period 1970-2007
is ng/np = 0.17, and the average public/private wage ratio is wg/wp = 1.20. Next, the
29The time period is particularly suitable for the study of public employment, and government wage bill
spending; Hughes (1994), for example, argues that ”[i]n the 1970s, intellectual arguments were mounted
by conservative economists that government was the economic problem restricting economic growth and
freedom.”(p. 11)
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average effective tax rates on labor and physical capital, obtained from McDaniel’s (2009)
dataset are τ l = 0.409 and τ k = 0.16, respectively. McDaniel’s approach was preferred to
the one used by Mendoza et al. (1984) and the subsequent updates, e.g. Martinez-Mongay
(2000), Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) and Carey and Rabesona (2002), due to its more
careful treatment of property and import taxes in the former. The labor share, α = 0.71, was
computed as the average ratio of compensation of employees in total output. Alternatively,
average capital share, 1− α = 0.29, can be obtained as the mean ratio of gross capital com-
pensation in output from the EU Klems Database (2009). The private capital depreciation
rate was found to be δp = 0.082, while public capital depreciation rate was δg = 0.037 over
the period.
The discount rate β = 0.979 was calibrated from the steady-state consumption Euler equa-
tion to match the average private capital-to-output ratio in data. Next, parameter γ = 0.62,
which measures the weight on public sector hours in the public good production was ob-
tained as the average ratio of the public sector wage bill to total government expenditure
less transfers and subsidies, as in Cavallo (2005) and Linnemann (2009). The value is consis-
tent with OECD (1982) estimates for the period 1960-78 for Germany, which was obtained
from a log-linear regression estimation. Additionally, the calibrated value of public capital
elasticity, 1−γ = 0.38, is consistent with the government capital effect estimated in Aschauer
(1989) and Hjerppe et al. (2006).
As in Cavallo (2005) and Linnemann (2009), a logarithmic specification was chosen for
the utility of private consumption, namely σc = 1. This follows Merz (1995) and Gomes
(2012), who argue that workers from the private and public sector are able to pool their
resources together, and thus achieve complete insurance.30 Similarly, as in Gali (2008), the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is assumed to be approximately unity, i.e.,
σl = 1. In addition, the logarithmic form for the utility of leisure has empirical support,
e.g. Asch and Heaton (2008) and Falsch (2008), who find that public labor supply elasticity
in two representative sectors, secondary education and defense, does not differ significantly
from unity. The logarithmic specifications for private consumption and leisure may seem
restrictive at first sight, but it assists greatly in matching hours across sectors, which is the
30A similar claim is made in Blundell et al. (2012) in the context of family labor supply and consumption
smoothing.
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dimension of interest in this paper, rather a focus on issues such as risk aversion, and/or the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply.31
Next, as in Chatterjee and Ghosh (2009), the curvature of the government services util-
ity component was set to σs = 0.95 to reflect the ”degree of relative congestibility associated
with the utility benefits derived from the public goods.” Alternatively, 1/σs measures the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of government services, or how responsive the median
household (voter) is to growth in public services with respect to the changes in the median
household’s income.32 Given that government services are modeled as a non-market output,
and the normalization of private consumption good to unity, total income is a good proxy
for the willingness of pay, as it represents the tax base on which the government levies taxes
to finance the provision of public services. The value for σs used in the calibration is in
line with the findings in Falvey and Gemmel (1996), who estimate the elasticity 1
σs
to fall
in the [1.04, 1.07] interval for general government services (i.e. σs ∈ [0.93, 0.95]), and Gibson
(1980), who estimates that the income elasticities for public services, such as social care,
education, pollution control, parks and recreational areas, as well as highway construction
and maintenance, are slightly higher than unity. In other words, agents are elastic, but not
greatly so: still, they do not want to accept large variations in the level of public services
provided over time. Furthermore, in the exogenous policy setup, parameter σs does not affect
allocations (but it affects the level of utility), since the household ignores the externality.
Thus, the level of government services will be residually determined given the steady-state
public employment and government capital stock.33
The average steady-state total hours of work in data as a share of total hours available
is n = 0.296, hence total employment in the model is consistent with the estimates in Ghez
and Becker (1975) of the fraction of time spent working. Together with the public/private
employment ratio, this yields the model-consistent steady-state values for private and public
31Allowing for a general CRRA representation of the utility of consumption and leisure leads to convergence
problems in the optimal policy framework.
32Since all households are the same, the median household is the same as the average, or the representative
one in the model.
33In the optimal policy case, the congestibility condition for public services, σs < 1, turns out to be a
necessary and sufficient to produce a decrease in steady-state decrease in the rent-seeking time relative to
the exogenous policy case.
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hours, np = 0.253 and ng = 0.043, respectively. Steady-state public hours in the model
are set to the value in data. The weight on utility from government services was set to
ψ3 = 0.15, which is consistent with the value used in Finn (1994) and Klein et al. (2008).
Next, the weights attached to private consumption ψ1 = 0.35 and ψ2 = 0.50 are set to match
exactly both types of hours in data.34 Note that ψ1 is set larger than the average time
spent working, as suggested in Kydland (1995), due to the presence of government work
transaction cost, and the existence of rent-seeking in the public sector. On the other hand,
the model is roughly consistent with Bouakez and Rebel (2007), Leeper et al. (2009), and
Conesa et al. (2009), who argue that private consumption good is on average twice as valu-
able as government services, as ψ1/ψ3 = 2.33, and leisure is twice as valuable as the private
consumption good, as ψ1/ψ1 = 1.43. The scale parameter of the transaction cost associated
with government work, ϕ = 2.318, is calibrated to match the average public/private wage
ratio in the data.
Total factor productivity moments, ρa = 0.943 and σa = 0.013, were obtained in several
steps: First, using the model’s aggregate production function specification and data series
for physical capital and labor, Solow residuals (SR) were computed in the following way:
lnSRt = ln yt − (1− α) ln kpt − α lnnpt . (3.2.1)
The logged series were then regressed on a linear trend (b > 0) to obtain
lnSRt = bt+ 
SR
t . (3.2.2)
Observe that the residuals from the regression above,
SRt = lnSRt − bt ≡ ln at, (3.2.3)
represent the stationary, or detrended, component of the logged TFP series.
Next, the AR(1) regression
ln at = β0 + β1 ln at−1 + at (3.2.4)
was run using ordinary least squares (OLS) to produce the estimates (denoted by the ”hat”
symbol) for the persistence and standard deviation parameters of the total factor productivity
34Observe that given the pre-set value for ψ3 and the fact that ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3 = 1, by setting ψ1, ψ2 will
be residually determined.
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process to be used in the calibration of the model. In particular,
βˆ1 = ρ
a (3.2.5)
ˆat ∼ N(0, σ2a). (3.2.6)
Table 1 on the next page summarizes all model parameters used in the calibration.
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Table 1: Model Parameters
Param. Value Definition Source
β 0.979 Discount factor Calibrated
α 0.710 Labor income share Data average
δp 0.082 Depreciation rate on private capital Data average
δg 0.037 Depreciation rate on public capital Data average
ψ1 0.350 Weight on consumption in utility Calibrated
ψ2 0.500 Weight on leisure in utility Calibrated
ψ3 0.150 Weight on government services in utility Set
σc 1.000 Curvature parameter of the private consumption utility component Set
σl 1.000 Curvature parameter of the leisure utility component Set
σs 0.950 Curvature parameter of the government services utility component Set
ϕ 2.318 Scale parameter of government work transaction cost Calibrated
γ 0.620 Labor share in public services production Data average
1− γ 0.380 Capital share in public services production Calibrated
τ k 0.160 Effective tax rate on capital income Data average
τ l 0.409 Effective tax rate on labor income Data average
A 1.000 Steady-state level of total factor productivity Set
ρa 0.943 AR(1) parameter total factor productivity Estimated
σa 0.013 SD of total factor productivity innovation Estimated
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4 Steady state results
Once model parameters were obtained, the unique steady-state of the system was computed
numerically for the Germany-calibrated model. Results are reported in Table 2 below, where
r¯ = (1− τ k)(r− δp) denotes the after-tax net of depreciation real return to private capital.
Table 2: Data averages and long-run solution
Description GE Data Model
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.590 0.784
i/y Private investment-to-output ratio 0.210 0.192
gi/y Public investment-to-output ratio 0.023 0.023
kp/y Private capital-to-output ratio 2.350 2.346
kg/y Public capital-to-output ratio 0.630 0.630
sg/y Public services-to-output ratio 0.193 0.225
gt/y Public transfers-to-output 0.170 0.228
wpnp/y Private labor share in output 0.710 0.710
wgng/y Public wage bill share in output 0.130 0.145
rk/y Private capital share in output 0.290 0.290
wg/wp Public/Private wage ratio 1.200 1.200
wp Private sector wage rate - 1.006
wg Public sector wage rate - 1.207
w˜p After-tax private wage rate - 0.595
w˜g After-tax public wage rate - 0.714
n Total employment 0.296 0.296
np Private employment level 0.253 0.253
ng Public employment level 0.043 0.043
rs Rent-seeking level - 0.009
ng/np Public/private employment ratio 0.170 0.170
r¯ After-tax net return to capital 0.036 0.035
The model performs relatively well vis-a-vis data. It slightly overestimates average consump-
tion and underestimates the investment shares in output. This mismatch is due to the fact
that the model treats government wage bill consumption as a transfer payment, and not as
final public consumption, as is the case in the national accounts. This is not an issue here
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as the main objective of the model is to replicate the stylized facts in the labor markets.
However, the model accurately captures the long-run after-tax capital return, where the
latter is proxied by the average return on 10-year generic bonds net of CPI inflation. More-
over, the imputed government services is also predicted to make a significant share of output.
Along the labor market dimension, the model was calibrated to match the average time
spent working, and the wage and employment ratios in data. Given the focus on the effects
of rent-seeking in the public sector, the framework was calibrated to reproduce those stylized
facts in the steady state, as this framework will provide an important benchmark for the
measures use to quantify the loss from rent-seeking activities on the economy. Next, the ratio
of time spent rent-seeking to public employment is a non-trivial figure in steady-state: Using
p ≡ wg
wp
to denote the steady-state wage ratio, one can obtain rs
ng
= (p−1)n
g
ng
= p − 1 = 0.20.
This value is consistent with the results obtained in Angelopoulos et al. (2009), who found
that 18 % of time in Germany is spent rent-seeking. Thus, the non-productive rent-seeking
in the public sector is also likely to generate a significant waste on aggregate level.35
5 Long-Run Cost of Rent-seeking
The model in this paper naturally suggests estimates of rent-seeking time. It also provides
estimates that aim to quantify the loss from rent-seeking in terms of output. In turn, given
the calibration objective in this paper to match hours in each sector, the values for other
EU countries can be easily obtained from data averages after some transformations. Given
the calibrated values for different countries in EU, a ranking can be constructed for different
countries. Finally, the model-based estimates are compared to empirical measures of institu-
tional quality. One such index is the compound International Country Risk Guide (ICRG),
where the values for a selected set of European countries were obtained from Angelopoulos et
al. (2009).36 Additionally, a second set of indicators, the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) were extracted from the WDI database. Detailed description of the indices used in
this paper is provided in Appendix 11.4. The chosen indices reflected government size, con-
trol of corruption, expenditure effectiveness of public funds, government effectiveness, and
35Note that given the structure of the problem, and the symmetry imposed, a first-best solution is to set
rent-seeking to zero, as this results in a higher welfare. This is investigated Appendix 11.3.1. The other
special case, when the government sets equal wages in the two sectors, is presented in Appendix 11.3.2.
36For more detailed discussion of this index, interested readers should consult Knack and Keefer (1995)
24
the efficiency of public administration.37
The first measures to be used in the comparison with indices is the steady-state rent-seeking
time itself, which was computed as:
rs = (p− 1)ng. (5.0.7)
Second, rent-seeking time is also expressed in relative terms as a share of public hours38 to
obtain:
rs
ng
=
(p− 1)ng
ng
= p− 1. (5.0.8)
Next, several estimates of the loss imposed on the economy, in terms of output, were also
calculated. The first such expression is named ”wasteful lobbying cost,” as it represents
the opportunity cost of using time to engage in rent-seeking activities, which is not directly
productive (but only indirectly increases the probability of winning the contestable prize,
and/or increases the labor income from government work), instead of using the time to
produce public services, which have utility-generating effect. The analytical representation
of this cost is as follows:
wgrs
y
=
pwp(p− 1)ng
y
=
(p− 1)png
np
wpnp
y
= α(p− 1)pn
g
np
. (5.0.9)
Furthermore, the value of the contestable transfer, the government wage bill, could also be
regarded as a wasteful expenditure. This is because public sector wage and employment are
determined in a non-competitive market, and public consumption is valued much less than
the private consumption good. In other words, the wage paid to government employees is
unrelated to productivity of labor in the government services production function. More-
over, the share of government wage bill in output can be also represented as a product of
”primitives” as follows:
wgng
y
=
pwpnp
y
ng
np
= pα
ng
np
. (5.0.10)
37World Values Studies compute a ”general trust” measure, which is also highly correlated with indices of
corruption and institutional quality (La Porta et al. 1997) and where the measure aims to capture the level
of social trust and confidence in the government.
38Since rent-seeking occurs only in the public sector, it does not make much sense to express it relative to
the total labor supply.
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Therefore, the total waste in the economy is the sum of the lobbying cost and the wage bill
share. Given that government employees are not entirely wasteful, the combined measure
presented below could be regarded as the upward bound of the total loss in the economy
from rent-seeking, expressed relative to output. The analytical representation obtained is as
follows:
wgrs
y
+
wgng
y
= α(p− 1)pn
g
np
+ pα
ng
np
= αp2
ng
np
. (5.0.11)
As seen from above, in the long run, the cost of rent seeking as a share in output depends
only on the private labor share in output, the gross public wage mark-up p (i.e. the average
public/private wage ratio), as well as the average public/private employment ratio. Thus,
the model predicts that countries with a high labor share in aggregate production function,
a high public employment share in total, and high wages in the public relative to the private
sector, will feature the highest losses.
Since the model was constructed to match those dimensions in data, estimates of the mea-
sures above were easily computed from OECD (2011) data for a cross-section of EU countries,
without explicitly calibrating the model for all the countries, but rather by simply computing
the required averages for the corresponding country from OECD data directly. Following
Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011), all measures are presented and ranked in Table 3 on the
next page, together with the ICRG index first. A lower rent-seeking cost corresponds to a
higher ranking. A higher value of the ICRG index reflects better institutions, and a higher
ranking for the country.39
Results in Table 3 above show that the cost of lobbying is 2.9 % of GDP for Germany, but
can reach 9 % of GDP in Greece, 11.8 % in the Netherlands, and 11.32 % in Spain. The
magnitude of these is in line with Magee et al. (1989), who show in a static model that 5-15
% of an economy’s capital and labor is lost in predatory lobbying. Next, when the share of
the public wage bill is added, the costs rise significantly. Germany is still the leader with
the lowest loss (17 %), while Greece features the highest figure (31 %), followed immedi-
ately by Belgium (30 %), Italy (30 %), and Spain (30 %). These values are also comparable
with earlier studies, e.g., using a static framework, Mohammad and Whalley (1994) compute
redistributive activity costs to be 25-40 % of Indian GNP, while Ross (1984) calculates it
39Overall, countries with larger shares of the government wage bill in output also feature higher tax rates.
However, since this paper focuses on the relationship between rent-seeking and the government wage bill,
and not on the effect of rent seeking on tax revenues, this stylized fact in data is not discussed.
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Table 3: Rent-seeking results in EU member countries
Country rs p ng/np rs/ng w
grs
y
wgng
y
wg(ng+rs)
y
ICRG
Austria 0.016(5) 1.28(5) 0.207(4) 0.28(5) 0.050(5) 0.180(5) 0.23(5) 47.22(5)
Belgium 0.021(7) 1.28(6) 0.285(9) 0.28(6) 0.066(7) 0.231(10) 0.30(7) 47.46(4)
Finland 0.003(2) 1.03(2) 0.353(11) 0.03(2) 0.008(2) 0.226(9) 0.23(6) 48.76(3)
France 0.001(1) 1.01(1) 0.320(10) 0.01(1) 0.002(1) 0.204(7) 0.21(3) 46.62(6)
Germany 0.010(3) 1.20(3) 0.170(2) 0.20(3) 0.029(3) 0.145(1) 0.17(1) 48.92(2)
Greece 0.038(11) 1.41(9) 0.260(7) 0.41(9) 0.090(9) 0.220(8) 0.31(11) 34.36(11)
Ireland 0.015(4) 1.22(4) 0.236(6) 0.22(4) 0.036(4) 0.169(2) 0.21(2) 44.37(7)
Italy 0.025(8) 1.30(7) 0.266(8) 0.30(7) 0.070(8) 0.232(11) 0.30(10) 40.90(8)
Netherlands 0.028(9) 1.69(11) 0.166(1) 0.69(11) 0.118(11) 0.171(3) 0.29(8) 49.40(1)
Portugal 0.020(6) 1.30(8) 0.217(5) 0.30(8) 0.052(6) 0.175(4) 0.23(4) 40.13(10)
Spain 0.034(10) 1.60(10) 0.195(3) 0.60(10) 0.112(10) 0.187(6) 0.30(9) 40.40(9)
as 38 % of Kenyan GNP.40 Lastly, the size of the rent-seeking cost in terms of output is
comparable to the estimates in Angelopoulos et al. (2009), who use a DSGE framework
with a rent-seeking extraction of the government tax revenue to calculate the cost to be in
the range of 0-16 % of GDP across the EU-12 countries.
Next, as documented in Table 4 below, rent-seeking estimates and loss measures are found
to be moderately- to highly-correlated to other indices of institutional quality. As expected,
rent-seeking time in steady-state is very strongly negatively related to the indices of bureau-
cratic efficiency, where the values range between −0.50 and −0.73. The public wage premium
is also moderately negatively related to institutional quality. This could be an indicator that
public sector wages are indeed determined within a political economy environment. Lastly,
the public/private employment ratio is essentially uncorrelated with the index values. The
two loss measures, the lobbying cost and government wage bill as shares in output, are mod-
erately to strongly negatively correlated with different indicators of bureaucratic efficiency.41
40These studies, however, focus on bureaucrats whose rent-seeking activity is tariff revenue extraction.
41Interestingly, the two loss measures produce the same correlations with the indices. This effect, however,
is a almost direct consequence of how the two measures were constructed,as the lobbying cost is proportional
to the government wage bill, with the coefficient of proportionality equal to (p− 1).
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Table 4: Correlation matrix
Index rs p ng/np rs/ng w
grs
y
wgng
y
wg(ng+rs)
y
ICRG index -0.68 -0.27 0.01 -0.27 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39
control of corruption index -0.58 -0.16 -0.09 -0.16 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32
public administration index -0.50 -0.12 -0.02 -0.12 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26
expenditure effectiveness index -0.73 -0.37 0.12 -0.37 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50
government effectiveness index -0.57 -0.19 0.04 -0.19 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
In the next step in the analysis, rent-seeking time was plotted against the indices. As seen
from Fig. 1 on the next page, this generated a good fit in a cross-section of EU countries.
There is a clear negative relationship with the indices of institutional quality, and a positive
one with the size of government. In the next section, the behavior of the model outside
of the steady-state is investigated. In particular, the transitional dynamics of the model
economy and the responses of the variables in the face of a surprise technological innovation
are presented and discussed.
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Figure 1: Rent-seeking time vs. indices of institutional quality
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6 Model solution and impulse responses
Since there is no closed-form general solution for the model in this paper, a typical approach
followed in the RBC literature is to log-linearize the stationary DCE equations around the
steady state, where xˆt = lnxt− lnx, and then solve the linearized version of the model. The
log-linearized system of model equations is derived and summarized in Appendix 11.5-11.6.
The linearized DCE system can be represented in the form of first-order linear stochastic
difference equations as in King, Plosser and Rebello (1988, 1999):
AEt+1xˆt = Bxˆt + Cεt, (6.0.12)
where A,B, and C are coefficient matrices, εt is a matrix of innovations, and xˆt is the
stacked vector of state (also called ’predetermined’) variables, sˆt =
[
aˆt kˆ
p
t kˆ
g
t
]′
, and
control variables, zˆt =
[
yˆt cˆt iˆt nˆt nˆ
p
t nˆ
g
t wˆ
p
t wˆ
g
t λˆt rˆst gˆ
i
t sˆ
g
t
]′
. Klein’s (2000)
generalized eigenvalue decomposition algorithm was used to solve the model. Using the model
solution, the impulse response functions (IRFs) were computed to analyze the transitional
dynamics of model variables to a surprise innovation to productivity.
6.1 The Effect of a positive productivity shock
Figure 1 shows the impact of a 1% surprise TFP innovation on the model economy. There
are two main channels through which the TFP shock affects the model economy. A higher
TFP increases output directly upon impact. This constitutes a positive wealth effect, as
there is a higher availability of final goods, which could be used for private and public con-
sumption, as well as for investment. From the rule for the government investment in levels,
a higher output translates into higher level of expenditure in that category (not pictured,
identical to output response). Next, the positive TFP shock increases both the marginal
product of capital and labor, hence the real interest rate (not illustrated) and the private
wage rate increase. The household responds to the price signals and supplies more hours in
the private sector, as well as increasing investment. This increase is also driven from both the
intertemporal consumption smoothing and the intra-temporal substitution between private
consumption and leisure. In terms of the labor-leisure trade-off, the income effect (”work
more”) produced by the increase in the private wage dominates the substitution effect (”work
less”). Furthermore, the increase of private hours expands output further, thus both output
and government spending categories increase slightly more than the amount of the shock
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upon impact. Over time, as private physical capital stock accumulates, marginal product
of capital falls, which decreases the incentive to invest. In the long-run, all variables return
to their old steady-state values. Due to the highly-persistent TFP process, the effect of the
shock is still present after 50 periods.
With regard to public sector labor dynamics, however, there is the additional effect of an in-
crease in productivity leading to an increase in income and consumption. Higher income and
consumption lead to greater tax revenue. In particular, the growth in government revenue
exceeds the increase in the fiscal spending instruments. As a result, the additional funds
available are spent on government investment and the wage bill. In turn, the increase in the
latter leads to an expansion in both public sector wages and hours. In addition, the model
in this paper generates an interesting dynamics in the wage and hours ratio, which is not
present in models with stochastic public employment, such as Finn (1998), Cavallo (2005)
or Linnemann (2009). The two wage rates, as well as the two types of hours move together,
but less than perfectly so, thus making the model consistent with the empirical evidence
presented in Lamo, Perez and Schuknecht (2007, 2008). In addition, as in the data, public
sector labor variables react much more strongly to positive technological innovations than
do their private sector counterparts.
Given that both public wages and hours react strongly and positively to technological im-
provements, the new variable in the model, rent-seeking time also increases. The intuition
behind this result is that during unexpectedly good times, tax revenues are larger than usual,
increasing the amount of funds ”up for grabs,” which are then expropriated by government
bureaucrats in the form of excessive salaries to government bureaucrats. Rent-seeking time
in the model thus responds very strongly to the dynamics of output, as it is related to the
tax base in the labor income generated in the economy.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock in Germany
32
Overall, a positive innovation to total factor productivity has a positive effect on the allo-
cations and prices in the economy. The novelty is that the endogenous public sector hours
model generates an important difference in the composition of household’s labor income with
the public sector share increasing at a much faster rate than the private sector labor income.
Another important observation to make is that the TFP shocks, being the main driving force
in the model, induce pro-cyclical behavior in public wages and hours. The shock effects are
smaller and variables reach their peak very quickly. This means that the impulse effect dies
out relatively fast. However, the transition period can still take up to 100 years. This illus-
trates the important long-run effects of TFP shocks on the wage- and hours ratios.
However, an important limitation of the exogenous policy analysis performed so far is that
both tax rates were taken to be fixed. In addition, government investment share was ex-
ogenously set, and public wage rate was a residually-determined instrument that always
adjusted accordingly to balance the budget. In effect, all interaction between the two tax
rates was precluded by construction - by fixing each to the corresponding average effective
rate in data over the chosen period of study. These restrictions will be lifted in the next
section, and the optimal fiscal policy framework will be considered in an environment, where
the two tax rates, government investment, public employment (and hence also government
services), public sector wage rate, and thus effectively the optimal rent-seeking time, are
chosen jointly by a benevolent government, whose preferences are perfectly aligned with the
household’s utility function.
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7 The Ramsey problem (optimal fiscal policy under
full commitment)
In this section, the government assumes the role of a benevolent planner, who takes into
account that the representative household and the firm behave in their own best interest,
taking fiscal policy variables as given. The instruments under government’s control in this
section are labor and capital tax rates, next-period public capital (and hence public in-
vestment), public employment and public sector wage rate (and thus the Ramsey planner
effectively determines rent-seeking time42). Government transfers are fixed at the level from
the exogenous policy case. It is assumed that only linear taxes are allowed, and that the
government can credibly commit to those. Thus, given the restriction to a set of linear
distortionary tax rates, only a second-best outcome is feasible. However, the emphasis on
the second-best theory makes the setup more realistic, and thus it can be taken as a better
approximation of the environment in which policymakers decide on a particular fiscal policy.
It is important to emphasize that each set of fiscal policy instruments implies a feasible
allocation that fully reflects the optimal behavioral responses of the household and firm. Al-
ternatively, each set of fiscal policy instruments can be thought of as generating a different
competitive equilibrium allocation, i.e. allocations and prices are contingent on the partic-
ular values chosen for the fiscal instruments. The difference from the analysis performed
so far in the paper, is that in the Ramsey framework, the government chooses all instru-
ments, instead of taking them as being exogenous. At the same time, the government also
optimally selects the allocations of agents, as dictated by the dual approach to the Ramsey
problem as in Chamley (1986).43 It it also assumed that the government discounts time
at the same rate as the households, and treats each household the same. The constraints
which the government takes into account when maximizing households’ welfare include the
government budget constraints, and the behavioral responses of both the household and the
42Note that the rent-seeking is the one from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, as the Ramsey planner
takes the DCE system of equations as the constraint set for the maximization problem, and thus also takes
the symmetry imposed as given.
43In contrast, the primal approach all the policy variables and prices are solved as functions of the alloca-
tions, thus the government decides only on the optimal allocation.
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firm. These are summarized in the symmetric DCE of the exogenous fiscal policy case.44,45
In other words, in the dual approach of Ramsey problem, which will be utilized in this sec-
tion, the choice variables for the government are {Ct, Npt , N gt , Kpt+1, Kgt+1, wpt , wgt , rt}∞t=0 plus
the two tax rates {τ lt , τ kt }∞t=0.46 The initial conditions for the state variable {A0, Kp0 , Kg0},
as well as the sequence of government transfers {Gtt}∞t=0 and the process followed by total
factor productivity {At}∞t=0 are taken as given.
Following the procedure in Chamley (1986) and Sargent and Ljungqvist (2004), the Ramsey
problem will be transformed and simplified, so that the government chooses the after-tax
interest rate r˜t and wage rates w˜
p
t and w˜
p
t directly, instead of setting tax rates and prices
separately, where
r˜t ≡ (1− τ kt )rt, (7.0.1)
w˜pt ≡ (1− τ lt )wpt , (7.0.2)
w˜gt ≡ (1− τ lt )wgt . (7.0.3)
Thus, the transformed government budget constraint becomes
At(Nt)
αK1−αt − r˜tKt − w˜ptNpt = w˜gtN gt +Kgt+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +Gtt. (7.0.4)
Once the optimal after-tax returns are solved for, the expression for the before-tax real in-
terest rate and private wage can be obtained from the DCE system. Solving for optimal
capital and labor tax rates is then trivial.
The transformed symmetric Ramsey problem (note that rent-seeking is already substituted
44The DCE system is summarized in Appendix 11.5.
45Stockman (2001) shows that the absence of debt and thus the inability of the government to run surpluses
and deficits has no dramatic effect on the optimal policies in the full commitment case.
46Note that by choosing next-period public capital, the planner is choosing public investment {Git}∞t=0
optimally. Similarly, by choosing public employment and the wage ratio optimally, the government chooses
rent-seeking time {RSt}∞t=0 optimally as well.
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out in the household’s utility function) then becomes:
max
Ct,N
p
t ,N
g
t ,K
p
t+1,K
g
t+1,w˜
p
t ,w˜
g
t ,r˜t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ψ1
Cσct
1− σc
+ψ2
[
1−Npt −N gt −N gt [(w˜gt /w˜pt )− 1]− ϕ(N gt )2
]1−σl
1− σl
+
ψ3
1− σs
[
(N gt )
γ(Kgt )
1−γ
](1−σs)}
(7.0.5)
s.t
1
Cσct
= βEt
1
Cσct+1
[
1− δp + (1− τ kt+1)(1− α)
Yt+1
Kpt+1
]
(7.0.6)
ψ2C
σc
t = ψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt −N gt [(w˜gt /w˜pt )− 1]− ϕ(N gt )2
]σl
(1− τ lt )wpt (7.0.7)
ψ2C
σc
t [1 + 2ϕN
g
t ] = ψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt −N gt [(w˜gt /w˜pt )− 1]− ϕ(N gt )2
]σl
(1− τ lt )wgt (7.0.8)
RSt = N
g
t
[
(w˜gt /w˜
p
t )− 1
]
(7.0.9)
At(N
p
t )
αK
(1−α)
t = Ct +K
g
t+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +Kpt+1 − (1− δp)Kpt (7.0.10)
At(Nt)
αK1−αt − r˜tKt − w˜ptNpt = w˜gtN gt +Kgt+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +Gtt (7.0.11)
Kpt+1 = It + (1− δp)Kpt (7.0.12)
rt = (1− α) Yt
Kpt
(7.0.13)
wpt = α
Yt
Npt
(7.0.14)
Sgt = (N
g
t )
γ(Kgt )
(1−γ) (7.0.15)
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Kgt+1 = G
i
t + (1− δg)Kgt . (7.0.16)
After numerically solving for the unique steady-state, the full characterization of the long-
run Ramsey equilibrium is summarized in Table 6 on the next page, where the same values
for the parameters from the exogenous policy section (see Table 1) were used.47
As in Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992) and Ohanian (1997), parameter ξ is in-
troduced to measure the consumption-equivalent long-run welfare gain of moving from the
steady-state allocations in the exogenous policy case to the equilibrium values obtained under
Ramsey policy. In other words, the value of ξ measures the share of steady-state consump-
tion under the exogenous policy that the household has to be compensated with, in order to
achieve the same level of utility as the one under the Ramsey policy. A fraction ξ > 0, which
is the case reported in Table 6 on the next page, demonstrates that the agent is better-off
under Ramsey, while ξ < 0 would have implied that the agent is worse-off under Ramsey.
There are several additional important findings in the Ramsey equilibrium that can be seen
in Table 6 on the next page. First, as expected, total discounted welfare is higher under
the Ramsey regime.48 Next, private consumption share is lower, while private capital- and
investment shares are higher, and thus interest rate is lower. The model generates a zero
steady-state optimal capital tax, and a higher labor tax rate. All these results are consistent
with the findings in earlier studies, e.g. Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992), Sargent
and Ljungqvist (2004) and Kocherlakota (2010). In addition, earlier studies that use the
representative-agent setup, e.g. Lucas (1990) and Cooley and Hansen (1992), have shown
that tax reforms which abolish capital taxation, even at the expense of a higher tax burden
on labor, still produce significant welfare gains for the society.
47The dynamic version of the model was also solved to check that the model possesses saddle-path sta-
bility, i.e. that for t ≥ 1, given initial conditions for Kp,Kg the model has a unique set of sequences for
{Ct, Npt , Ngt ,Kpt+1,Kgt+1, wpt , wgt , rt, τ lt , τkt }∞t=0 that converges to the steady-state.
48The positive values of utility are due to the domination of the government services term, given that
σs < 1 (but close to unity).
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Table 5: Data averages and long-run solution: exogenous vs. optimal policy
Description GE Data Exogenous Ramsey
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.590 0.784 0.718
i/y Private investment-to-output ratio 0.210 0.192 0.229
gi/y Public investment-to-output ratio 0.023 0.023 0.053
kp/y Private capital-to-output ratio 2.350 2.346 2.793
kg/y Public capital-to-output ratio 0.630 0.630 1.442
sg/y Public services-to-output ratio 0.193 0.225 0.229
wpnp/y Private labor share in output 0.710 0.710 0.710
wgng/y Public wage bill share in output 0.130 0.145 0.102
rk/y Private capital share in output 0.290 0.290 0.290
wg/wp Public/Private wage ratio 1.200 1.200 1.277
wp Private sector wage rate - 1.006 1.080
wg Public sector wage rate - 1.207 1.379
w˜p After-tax private wage rate - 0.595 0.603
w˜g After-tax public wage rate - 0.714 0.770
n Total employment 0.296 0.296 0.294
np Private employment level 0.253 0.253 0.264
ng Public employment level 0.043 0.043 0.030
rs Rent-seeking time - 0.009 0.008
ng/np Public/private employment ratio 0.170 0.170 0.112
r¯ After-tax net return to capital 0.036 0.035 0.022
τ k Capital income tax rate 0.160 0.160 0.000
τ l Labor income tax rate 0.409 0.409 0.442
U Total discounted welfare - 95.02 96.47
ξ Welfare gain - 0 0.095
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Next, due to the presence of a second labor market, as well as the endogenous public sector
hours, sophisticated labor market interactions are generated. In the framework presented in
this paper, the labor market structure allows for labor flows between sectors. Furthermore,
the government internalizes the public services externality in its choice. Thus, it picks the
socially optimal levels of public hours and capital stock to provide the optimal level of the
public consumption good. In addition, the planner chooses a different mix between the in-
puts used in the provision of government services: a higher level of government investment
is undertaken, while fewer public hours are employed than the in the DCE solution. As a
result, public investment (and thus public capital) share is more than double than that of
the exogenous policy case. As a result, the amount of the public good produced relative to
output is also slightly higher. In addition, public hours are substituted for private hours,
keeping the total virtually unchanged.
In terms of the relative price of labor in the two labor markets, both the after-tax pri-
vate and public wage rates increase slightly. The higher public/private wage ratio, and thus
the higher public wage premium in the optimal policy case overcompensate for the increase
in the labor tax. Furthermore, the public/private hours ratio is lower, due to the substitu-
tion away from labor in the government sector. In other words, the increase in the public
wage premium is driven by budgetary considerations, as the public wage is the residually-
determined fiscal instrument that balances the per-period government budget constraint. In
addition, the result is consistent with economic logic and scarcity argument: relatively fewer
hours are employed in the public sector, thus the steady-state public wage rate is higher.
Furthermore, optimal government wage consumption is significantly lower. In turn, opti-
mally chosen rent-seeking level is also lower, as the public employment effect dominated the
public wage premium effect.49,50
49This effect is due to the fact that public goods are congestible, or that 0 < σs < 1. For a case when
σs ≥ 1, a case not supported by empirical data, optimal rent-seeking is higher than in the exogenous case,
which is counterintuitive, and thus not considered here. In particular, a value higher than unity for σs results
in a higher public wage premium and government investment, but dampens the negative effect on public
employment.
50Alternatively, the rent-seeking chosen in the exogenous policy case can be interpreted as being ”third-
best,” as households ignore the utility effect of public hours working through the government services pro-
duction function, and thus the DCE choice is inferior to the second-best choice made by the benevolent
Ramsey government.
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The value-added of the rent-seeking model with endogenous public hours and wages is that
it generates predictions about the long-run effects of fiscal policy through labor markets, as
well as the level of rent-seeking in the government sector, which is in line with earlier studies.
In particular, the benevolent Ramsey planner corrects two inefficiencies in the government
sector, the excessive employment and the scarcity of public capital.51 Moreover, the wage-
and employment ratios, the optimal composition of the government wage bill consumption,
as well as the distribution of spending across government expenditure categories were all
important elements of the analysis on the optimal amount of rent-seeking activity within
the public administration. The novel results obtained in this paper were generated from
the incorporation of a richer government spending side, are new and interesting for policy
makers, as previous research had ignored these important dimensions.
The result that cuts in the wage bill have expansionary effect on the economy is not new to
the empirical macroeconomic studies, e.g. Algan et al. (2002), Alesina (1997), Alesina et al.
(2001), Alesina et al. (2002), and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). However, the optimal public
wage and employment aspects in the analysis are novel in the modern macroeconomic liter-
ature, given the predominance of setups with single wage rates, and exogenously-determined
public employment. In addition, given the doubling in public investment share, the fixed
level of government transfers, and the reduction of the public wage share in output, the
loss of capital income tax revenue requires steady-state labor tax to increase by only 3.3%
relative to the rate used in the exogenous policy case. The changes in the distribution of
spending, as well as the optimal amount of rent-seeking, are new results in both the optimal
policy and political economy literatures. As seen in Table 6 on the previous page, if these
aspects are ignored, important public finance aspects are missed.
Finally, note that the restriction σs < 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition to gener-
ate lower rent-seeking under Ramsey. This value does not deal with rent-seeking theory per
se, but rather captures an important characteristic of public goods, namely their congestible
nature.52 This plausible assumption can be viewed as a technical condition: In the general
51These features of the public sector are first noted in Baumol (1965).
52In addition, 1/σs is also the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of government services, which in
data is slightly higher than unity, 1/σs ∈ [1.03, 1.07], hence σs ∈ [0.93, 0.97].
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case, with CRRA utility for government services, optimal public wages are higher, and opti-
mal public employment is lower. However, only when σs < 1, the compositional effect on the
wage bill is such that optimal rent-seeking is lower than the value in the exogenous policy
case.
In the next section, the analysis is extended to the behavior of the Ramsey economy out-
side of the steady-state. The transitional dynamics of model variables, and rent-seeking in
particular, under optimal policy setup is also analyzed. In particular, the optimal responses
of the fiscal instruments and the other prices and allocations to positive shocks to TFP is
presented and discussed.
8 Optimal reaction of fiscal policy instruments to pro-
ductivity shocks
The optimal policy model is now solved using the first-order linearization procedure from
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) to study the dynamics of prices and allocations outside the
steady-state.53 The model solution is then used to study transitional behavior in response
to a surprise innovation in total factor productivity. Under the optimal policy (Ramsey)
regime, endogenous variables would generally react differently to the responses to a positive
technology shock under the exogenous fiscal policy case. Fig. 3 summarizes all responses
to a 1 % surprise innovation to total factor productivity. To highlight differences across
regimes, Fig. 4 plots on the same graph both the IRFs from the exogenous policy case and
the optimal ones. The new variables in the system are the five fiscal policy instruments -
capital and labor taxes, as well as public investment (hence public capital), public wage rate
and public employment. Note that by choosing the two wage rates, and employment in the
public sector, the planner determines the optimal amount of rent-seeking time. Therefore,
by intervening in the public sector labor market, the benevolent government can influence
private sector labor market, and thus affect the course of the economy. In addition, the gov-
ernment can use the available fiscal instruments at its disposal to affect rent-seeking among
bureaucrtats, and thus reduce the loss due to these counter-productive activities.
53Given the absence of curvature in the model, the second-order approximation to the equilibrium system
of equations did not change results significantly.
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In period 0, after the realization of the unexpected technology innovation, capital tax stays
unchanged.54 This result is in line with previous findings in the literature, e.g. Chari and
Kehoe (1994, 1999) who show that in a standard RBC model capital tax rate does not re-
spond to productivity shocks. In other words, the benevolent government would not deviate
from the optimal zero steady-state capital tax rate even in the face of uncertain productivity
shocks.55 Next, labor income tax rate increases upon the impact of the positive surprise in-
novation in TFP and then slowly returns to its old steady-state; the substantial persistence
observed is in line with previous studies (Chari and Kehoe, 1994, 1999). However, due to the
richer structure of the and endogenously-determined government spending, the magnitude
of the response in the labor tax is higher.
Furthermore, given that public spending categories are optimally chosen in this framework,
the setup generates considerable more interaction among the variables than does standard
RBC model. For example, public investment increases substantially, as the government un-
der the Ramsey regime also chooses public capital and government services optimally as
well. Next, as in the exogenous policy case, there will be greater increase in public sector
wages than in the private sector wages. The higher volatility in public wages, as discussed
in earlier sections, is an artifact of the presence of transaction costs from government work.
The change in the public/private wage ratio in turn triggers a reallocation of labor resources
from the private to the public sector. Next, the outflow of hours from the firm leads to an
increase in the marginal product of capital; hence, the real interest rate increases. However,
from the complementarity between private labor and capital in the Cobb-Douglas production
function, private capital decreases. Therefore, due to the fall in the levels of the two private
inputs, output increases by less than the size of the technology shock.
54At first glance the huge percentage deviation from the steady-state for capital tax can be misleading.
However, noting that the steady-state capital tax rate under Ramsey is of order 10−10 ≈ 0, it follows that
the log-deviation from the steady-state is a very very large number indeed, as the denominator is close to
zero, although the absolute value of change is minute.
55This is also a result of the logarithmic specification of the household’s utility of consumption.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock under Ramsey policy
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock under exogenous and
Ramsey policy
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In addition, given the jump in government investment, private consumption and investment
fall upon the impact of the shock. Overall, the difference in the dynamics in the main
model variables under the Ramsey regime is due to the fact that the government chooses
the optimal levels of public hours and capital (and hence also public investment). Over
time, attracted by the above-steady-state real interest rate, more private investment is un-
dertaken by the government. In turn, private capital accumulation increases, and the usual
hump-shape dynamics appears. Higher capital input increases the marginal productivity
of labor, and private labor starts slowly to recover to its old steady-state. As time passes,
private consumption response also turns positive, and the shape if its response follows the
dynamic path of private capital. Lastly, the benevolent Ramsey planner chooses to suppress
the positive response of rent-seeking to technological improvements. This follows directly
from the fact that in the optimal policy case, the government chooses optimally both public
employment and the public/private wage ratio.
Overall, the positive innovations to TFP have a positive effect on the economy. Additionally,
there is a long-lasting internal propagation effect on the economy. This is due to the fact
that there are two labor markets featuring different wage rates, and labor can flow between
sectors in response to changes in the relative wage. Moreover, there is complementarity
between public hours and the public capital, which reinforces the complementarity between
private and public consumption in the household’s utility. The quantitative effect of public
sector labor market, however, completely dominates capital response in terms of the initial
dynamics. Nevertheless, in the long-run, the private capital accumulation effects becomes
the dominant one, as dictated by the standard neoclassical RBC model.
An interesting result is that a significant portion of the private gains are channeled to the
public sector in the form of higher spending on public wages and public investment. Indeed,
in this model both categories are productive expenditures, as labor and capital are combined
in the provision of the public good. Even though the household suffers a little from the lower
private consumption, this negative effect is overcompensated for by the increase in leisure (as
there is a greater fall in private hours relative to the increase in private hours), the decrease
in rent-seeking, and a higher level of public good consumption. Overall, it takes more than
100 years for all the model variables to return to their old steady states.
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9 Limitations of the study and suggestions for future
research
This section analyses the key assumptions of the model and proposes some possible exten-
sions to the current framework. First, it was assumed that the government sector wage bill is
the pool of public resources, which are up for grabs. In reality a much larger rent component
is the tax revenues, an avenue pursued in Angelopoulos et al. (2009), and thus not discussed
here. In the model in this paper, a positive rent exist because of the higher public wages, and
the high public employment. In addition, given the individual decision making in a DCE, a
positive amount of rent-seeking time is chosen by each government bureaucrat. Rent-seeking
in the model disappears if wages are equalized across sectors, or in case all agents decide to
play the cooperative solution to the rent-seeking game.
Second, the model assumed that each individual could work in both the private and the
public sector, or equivalently, that workers from different sectors could safely pool together
their resources and thus achieve complete insurance against variations in consumption. This
was the rationale for the households being modeled as risk-neutral agents. Since this study
is intended as the beginning of a long research agenda, the usual starting point is precisely
the representative household paradigm. The simple macro model was then used to see how
it matches data, and what the forces at work are. As a follow-up to the research in this
paper, other specific issues, requiring a much more detailed data match, could be pursued.
One such possible extension is to model government officials and private sector workers sep-
arately, as their preferences, and their attitude to risk might differ. This modeling choice,
however, would complicate the algebra too much with a limited promise of providing an-
alytically tractable and interesting results. Nonetheless, this line of research is left on the
agenda for future work.
Third, it was assumed that only public bureaucrats were allowed to engage in rent-seeking,
and the only rents available were the funds from the wage bill. In reality, a much larger
flow of funds are tax revenues, which can be expropriated for private gains by either public
bureaucrats, or business people. A model along these lines, but with private sector indi-
viduals, is presented in Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011). Furthermore, such schemes are
usually organized and jointly implemented by public bureaucrats and firm-owners. There
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will be insiders and outsiders to the scheme, both in the private and in the government
sector, or honest and corrupt individuals. However, in the model presented in this paper, all
consumers own shares in the firm, and work as bureaucrats at the same time, so there are
no outsiders. A very simple attempt in a partial-equilibrium setting is considered in Hillman
and Ursprung (2000), but in the current setup, it greatly increases the complexity of the
problem, and thus is left for further research.
Fourth, the model did not elaborate on the rent-seeking function. The simplest possible form
of the contestable logit function was chosen to abstract away from possible non-linearities.
The framework ignores rent-seeking in groups, and possible asymmetries in the distribution
of the ”prize.” Such extensions are possible (see Congleton et al. 2008), but make the model
cumbersome, and thus were not considered in this paper. The simpler, and much more ele-
gant representation of the auctioning mechanism was preferred instead in order to preserve
model elegance and ensure analytical tractability.
10 Conclusions
This paper studied the wasteful effect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link
between the rent-seeking behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage
bill, which was taken to represent the rent component. In particular, public officials were
modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. The rent-seeking
extraction technology in the government administration was modeled as in Murphy et al.
(1991) and incorporated in an otherwise standard Real-Business-Cycle (RBC) framework
with public sector. The model was calibrated to German data for the period 1970-2007.
The main findings are: (i) Due to the existence of a significant public sector wage premium
and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount of working time is spent rent-
seeking, which in turn leads to significant losses in terms of output; (ii) The measures for the
rent-seeking cost obtained from the model for the major EU countries are highly-correlated
to indices of bureaucratic inefficiency; (iii) Under the optimal fiscal policy regime, and with
congestible public goods, steady-state rent-seeking is significantly smaller relative to the
time spent in the exogenous policy case; (iv) In addition to the zero capital tax rate, and
the higher labor tax rate, the benevolent government planner invests more in public capital
and chooses a higher public wage premium, but sets a much lower public employment, thus
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achieving an overall decrease in the level of rent-seeking relative to the value obtained in the
exogenous case.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D. (2005) ”Politics and economics in weak and strong states,” Journal of
Monetary Economics 52, 1199-1226.
[2] Acemoglu, D., D. Ticchi, and A. Vindigni (2007) ”Emergence and Persistence of Inef-
ficient States,” Working Papers 0707, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of
Economics.
[3] Acemoglu, D. and T. Verdier (1998) ”Property rights, corruption, and the allocation of
talent: a general equilibrium approach,” Economic Journal 108, 1381-1403.
[4] Acemoglu, D., and Verdier, T. (2000). ”The Choice Between Market Failures and Cor-
ruption,” American Economic Review, vol. 90(1), pp. 194-211.
[5] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. (2001). ”The colonial origins of compar-
ative development: An empirical investigation,” American Economic Review, 91, 1369-
1401.
[6] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. (2002). ”Reversal of fortune: Geography
and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 118, 1231-1294.
[7] Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997) ”Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” Journal
of Political Economy, 105(1), 1-29.
[8] Alesina, A., Ardagna, S., Perotti, R. and Schiantarelli, F. (2002) ”Fiscal Policy, Profits
and Investment,” American Economic Review, June 2002, vol. 92, No. 3, pp. 571-589.
[9] Alesina, A., Danninger, S. and Rostagno, M. (2001). ”Redistribution Through Public
Employment: The Case of Italy,” IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol.
48.
[10] Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1997). ”Fiscal Adjustment in OECD Countries: Composi-
tion and Macroeconomic Effects,” IMF Staff Papers(June): 210-248.
48
[11] Algan, Y., Cahuc, P. and Zylberberg, A. (2002). ”Public Employment. Does it increase
Unemployment?” Economic Policy, April 2002, pp. 9-65.
[12] Angelopoulos, K., Philippopoulos, A., and Vassilatos, V.(2009). ”The social cost of rent
seeking in Europe,” European Journal of Political Economy 25, pp. 280-299.
[13] Angelopoulos, K., Economides, G., and Vassilatos, V. (2011). ”Do institutions matter
for economic fluctuations? Weak property rights in a business cycle model for Mexico,”
Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(3), pp. 511-531.
[14] Appelbaum, E. and Katz, E. (1987). ”Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political
Economy of Rent-Seeking,” The Economic Journal, vol. 97, pp. 685-99.
[15] Asch, B. and Heaton, P. (2008). ”Monopsony and Labor Supply in the Army and Navy,”
Industrial Relations Working Paper 537, Princeton University.
[16] Aschauer, D. (1989). ”Is public Expenditure Productive?,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 23, 177-200.
[17] Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K. J. Murphy (1999) ”Informal Authority in Organizations,”
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1), 56-73.
[18] Barro, R. (1997). Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study.
The MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass.
[19] Baumol, W. J. (1965). Welfare Economics and the theory of the state. LSE: London,
UK.
[20] Beaumont, P.B. (1980). ”Government as Employer - Setting an Example?” RIPA Stud-
ies : London, UK.
[21] Becker, G. and C. Muligan (2003) ”Deadweight costs and the size of government,”
Journal of Law and Economics, 46, 293-340.
[22] Bellante, D. and Jackson, M. (1979) Labor Economics: Choice in Labor Markets.
McGraw-Hill Book Company: NY, US.
[23] Bender, K. (1998) ”The central government-private sector wage differential,” Journal
of Economic Surveys 12, pp. 177-220.
49
[24] Bender, K. (1993) ”Examining equality between public- and private-sector wage differ-
ential,” Economic Inquiry 41, pp.62-79.
[25] Bendor, J., S. Taylor, and R. van Gaalen. (1985) ”Bureaucratic expertise vs. legisla-
tive authority: A model of deception and monitoring in budgeting,” American Political
Science Review 79, 1041-1060.
[26] Bendor, J., S. Taylor, and R. van Gaalen. (1987) ”Politicians, bureaucrats and asym-
metric information,” American Journal of Political Science 31, 796-828.
[27] Besley, T., and M. Ghatak (2003) ”Incentives, Choice, and Accountability in the Pro-
vision of Public Services,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19(2), 235-249.
[28] Bhagwati, J.N. (1982). ”Directly unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90, pp. 988-1002.
[29] Bhagwati, J.N. and Srinivasan, T.N. (1984). ”DUP Activities in Economic Theory,” in:
Neoclassical Political Economy. The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, ed.
by D.C. Colander, Balinger Publishing Company: Cambridge, MA,pp.17-32.
[30] Blanchflower, D. G. and Oswald, A. J. (1996) The Wage Curve. The MIT Press: London,
UK.
[31] Blundell, R., Pistaferi, L. and Saporta-Eksten, I. (2012) ”Consumption smoothing and
family labor-supply,” Stanford University, USA. Mimeo.
[32] Borcherding, T.E. (ed.) (1977) Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Sources of Government
Growth. Duke University Press: Durham, North Carolina.
[33] Bos, D. (2001) ”Bureaucrats and Public Procurement”, CESifo Working Paper 515.
[34] Bouakez, H. and Rebei, N. (2007). ”Why does private consumption rise after a govern-
ment spending shock?,” Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economic Assotia-
tion, vol. 40(3), pp. 954-979.
[35] Box, R. (2004). Public administration and society: Critical issues in American Gover-
nance. M. E. Sharpe: London, England.
[36] Breton, A. (1974) The Economic Theory of Representative Government. The MacMillan
Press Ltd: London, UK.
50
[37] Breton, A. and R. Wintrobe (1975) ”The equilibrium size of a budget-maximizing bu-
reau: A note on Niskanen’s theory of bureaucracy”. Journal of Political Economy, 82,
195-207.
[38] Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. University of Michi-
gan Press: Ann Arbor, Michigan.
[39] Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M., and Rebello, S. (1993). ”Labor Hoarding and the Busi-
ness Cycle,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 101(2), pp. 245-73.
[40] Burnside, C. and Eichenbaum, M. (1996). ”Factor Hoarding and the Propagation of
Business-Cycle Shocks,” American Economic Review, vol. 86(5), pp. 1154-74.
[41] Burgess, S., and M. Ratto (2003) ”The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues
and Evidence,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19(2), 285-300.
[42] Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M., and Fisher, J. (2004). ”Fiscal shocks and their conse-
quences,” Journal of Economic Theory 115, pp. 89-117.
[43] Cameron, D. R. (1978) ”The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Anal-
ysis,” American Political Science Review, 72(4), 1243-1261.
[44] Carey, D. and Rabesona, J. (2002). ”Tax ratios on labour and capital income and
consumption,” OECD Economic Studies, No. 35.
[45] Carey, D. and Tchilinguirian, H. (2000). ”Average Effective Tax Rates on Capital,
Labour and Consumption,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 258.
[46] Casas-Pardo, J. and M. Puchades-Navarro. (2001) ”A critical comment on Niskanen’s
model,” Public Choice, 107, 147-167.
[47] Cavallo, Michele. (2005). ”Government employment expenditure and the effects of fiscal
policy shocks,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2005-16.
[48] Chamley, C. (1986). ”Optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium,” Econo-
metrica, vol. 54, pp. 604-622.
[49] Chari, V.V. and Kehoe, P. (1994). ”Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Real Business Cycle
Model,” Journal of Political Economy, vol.102, no.4 (Aug.), pp. 617-652.
51
[50] Chari, V.V. and Kehoe, P. (1999). ”Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy,” in Taylor,
J. and Woodford, M. (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol.1 (Amsterdam: North-
Holland).
[51] Chatterjee, S. and Ghosh, S. (2009). ”Public Goods, Congestion, and Fiscal Policy: Do
Consumption-Based Instruments Matter?,” Economics and Finance Working Papers,
Brunel University, UK.
[52] Cho, J. and Cooley, T.F. (1994). ”Employment and Hours over the Business Cycle,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 18, pp. 411-432.
[53] Conesa, J. C., Kitao, S. and Krueger, D. (2009). ”Taxing Capital? Not a bad idea after
all!,” American Economic Review, 99(1), pp. 25-48.
[54] Congleton, P. (1980). ”Competitive Process, Competitive Waste, and Institutions,”
Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society, ed. by J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison, and G.
Tullock,Texas A&M University Press: College Station, TX, pp. 153-79.
[55] Congleton, R.D., Hillman, A.L., Konrad, K.A. (2008) ”Forty Years of Research on
Rent-Seeking: an Overview.” In: Congleton et al. (eds.) Forty Years of Research on
Rent-Seeking, Vol. 1: Theory of Rent-Seeking. Springer, Berlin, pp. 1-42.
[56] Corcoran, W.J., and Karels, G.V. (1985). ”Rent-seeking behavior in the long-run,”
Public Choice 46: 227-246.
[57] Cooley, T. and Hansen, G. (1992). ”Tax distortions in a neoclassical monetary economy,”
Journal of Economic Theory 58, pp. 290-316.
[58] Cooper, R. (1999). Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics,
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
[59] Cooper, R. and John, A. (1988). ”Coordinating Corrdination Failures in Keynesian
Models,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 441-463.
[60] Cowling, K. and Mueller, D. (1978). ”The Social Cost of Monopoly,” European Journal
vol 88, pp. 727-48.
[61] De Fraja, G. (1993) ”Productive efficiency in public and private firms,” Journal of
Public Economics, 50, 15-30.
52
[62] Dewatripont, M., I. Jewitt, and J. Tirole (1999) ”The economics of career concerns,
Part II: Application to missions and accountability of government agencies,” Review of
Economic Studies, 66, 199-217.
[63] Dixit, A. (2002). ”Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative
Review,” Journal of Human Resources, 37(4), 696-727.
[64] Dixit, A. (2006) ”Predatory States and Failing States: An Agency Perspective,” Work-
ing Papers 71, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic
Policy Studies.
[65] Dixit, A. (2010) ”Democracy, Autocracy and Bureaucracy,” Journal of Globalization
and Development, 1(1).
[66] Dodlova, M. (2013) ”Political Accountability and Real Authority of Government Bu-
reaucrats”, Paris School of Economics, Mimeo.
[67] Drazen, Allan. (2000) Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton University
Press: Princeton, NJ.
[68] Economides, G., Park, H., and Philippopoulos, A. (2007). ”Optimal Protection of Prop-
erty Rights in a General Equilibrium Model of Growth,” Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics 109(1), 153-175.
[69] Economides, G., Philippopoulos, A. and Malley, J. (2004). ”Electoral Uncertainty, Fiscal
Policies and Growth: Theory And Evidence From Germany, The UK And The US,” Royal
Economic Society Annual Conference 39, Royal Economic Society.
[70] Economides, G., Philippopoulos, A. and Vassilatos, V. (2011). ”Public Providers, versus
Private Providers, of Public Goods: A General Equilibrium Study of the Role of the
State.” CES Ifo Working Paper, No. 3487.
[71] Egorov, G., and K. Sonin (2009) ”Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the
Loyalty- Competence Trade-Off,” Journal of European Economic Association, forthcom-
ing.
[72] Elliott, K. A. (1997). ”Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview and
Recommendations,” Corruption and the Global Economy, ed. by K.A. Elliott, Institute
for International Economics, pp. 175-223.
53
[73] European Commission (2009). Public Finances in the EMU, pp. 71-82.
[74] EU Klems Database (2009). Available on-line at: www.euklems.net
[75] Falsch, T. (2008). ”The elasticity of labor supply at establishment level,” Industrial
Relations Working Paper 536, Princeton University.
[76] Falvey, R. E. (1996). ”Are services income-elastic? Some new evidence,” Review of
Income and Wealth, Series 42, No. 3.
[77] Finn, M. (1994). ”Is all government capital productive?,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond Economics Quarterly, Vol. 79/4.
[78] Finn, Mary G. (1998). ”Cyclical Effects of Government’s Employment and Goods Pur-
chases.” International Economic Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Aug.), pp. 635-657.
[79] Fisman, R. and Gatti, R. (2002). ”Decentralization and corruption: evidence across
countries,” Journal of Public Economics, 83, 325-345.
[80] Francois, P. (2000) ”Public service motivation as an argument for government provi-
sion,” Journal of Public Economics, 78, 777-95.
[81] Fry, B. (1989) Mastering Public Administration: From Max Weber to Dwight Waldo.
Chatham House Publishers: Chatham, NJ.
[82] Gali, J. (2008). Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to
the New Keynesian Framework. Princeton University Press: Princeton, USA.
[83] Ghez, Gilbert, and Becker, Gary S. (1975). The Allocation of Time and Goods over the
Life Cycle, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[84] Giavazzi, F. and Pagano, M. (1990). ”Can Severe Fiscal Contractions be Expansionary?
Tales of Two Small European Countries,” in Blanchard, O. and Fischer, S. (eds.), NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press.
[85] Gibson, B. (1980). ”Estimating Demand Elasticities from Survey Data,” The American
Economic Review, vol. 70, no. 5, pp. 1069-1076.
[86] Goel, R. K. and Nelson, M. A. (1998) ”Corruption and Government size: A disaggre-
gated analysis,” Public Choice, 97, 107-120.
54
[87] Gomes, P. (2012). ”Optimal Public Sector Wages.” Carlos III University Working pa-
pers, Mimeo.
[88] Gortner, H. (1977). Administration in the public sector. John Wiley&Sons: London,
UK.
[89] Gregory, P. and V. Lazarev (2003) ”Commissars and Cars: A Case Study in the Political
Economy of Dictatorship,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(1), 1-19.
[90] Grossman, H. (2002). ”Make Us a King: Anarchy, Predation and the State,” European
Journal of Political Economy 18, 31-46.
[91] Guriev, S. (2004) ”Red tape and Corruption,” Journal of Development Economics,
73(2), pp. 489-504.
[92] Hall, R. and Jones, C. (1999). ”Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output
Per Worker than Hours,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83-116.
[93] Hayashi, F. and Prescott, E. C. (2007). ”The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade,” in: Great
Depressions of the Twentieth Century, T. J. Kehoe and E. C. Prescott (eds.). Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis: Minnesota, USA.
[94] Hillman, A. L., and Riley, J.G. (1989). ”Politically contestable rents and transfers,”
Economics and Politics, 1(1), 17-39.
[95] Hillman, A.L., and Ursprung, H.W. (2000). ”Political culture and economic decline.”
European Journal of Political Economy 16, 189-213. In: Congleton et al. (eds.) Forty
Years of Research on Rent-Seeking, Vol. 2: Applications: Rent-Seeking in Practice.
Springer, Berlin, pp. 219-243.
[96] Hjerppe, R., Kiander, J., Viren, M. (2006). ”Are Government Expenditure Productive?
Measuring the effects on private sector production,” Working paper, February 2006. Gov-
ernment Institute for Economic Research: Helsinki, Finland.
[97] Horn, M. J. (1995) The Political Economy of Public Administration, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[98] Hughes, O.E. (1994) Public Management and Administration: an Introduction. St. Mar-
tin’s Press: NY, USA.
55
[99] Judd, Kenneth. (1985) ”Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model,”
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 28, pp. 59-83.
[100] Kaplan, G. (2012) ”Inequality and the Lifecycle,” Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.
[101] Khan, M. and Sundaran, J.K. (2000) Rents, rent-seeking and economic development:
Theory and evidence in Asia, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
[102] King, Robert G., Plosser, Charles I. and Sergio T. Rebello. (1988) ”Production, growth,
and business cycles I: The basic neoclassical model,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
21(2), pp. 195-232.
[103] King R. and S. Rebelo (1999). ”Resuscitating real business cycles.” In: Handbook of
Macroeconomics, vol. 1B, eds J. Taylor and M. Woodford, North Holland.
[104] Klein, Paul. (2000) ”Using the generalized Schur form to solve a multivariate linear
rational expectations model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24, pp. 1405-
1423.
[105] Klein, Paul. (2000) MATLAB Code for ”Using the generalized Schur form to solve
a multivariate linear rational expectations model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 24, pp. 1405-1423.
[106] Klitgaard, R. (1991). Controlling corruption. University of California Press Ltd: Lon-
don, UK.
[107] Knack, S. and Kiefer, P. (1995). ”Institutions and economic performance: cross-country
tests using alternative institutional measures,” Economics and Politics 7, 207-227.
[108] Krueger, A. (1974). ”The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society,” American
Economic Review, vol. 64, pp. 291-303.
[109] Kydland, F. (1995) ”Business cycles and aggregate labor market fluctuations.” In: T.
Cooley (ed.), Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Princeton University Press: Prince-
ton, NJ.
[110] Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, E.C. (1982). ”Time to build and aggregate fluctua-
tions,” Econometrica 50(6), Nov 1982, pp. 1345-1369.
56
[111] Laband, D. and Sophocleus, J. (1988). ”The Social Cost of rent-seeking: First Esti-
mates,” Public Choice 58, 269-276.
[112] Laffont, J. J. (2000) Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford University Press, New
York.
[113] Laffont, J. J., and D. Martimort (2002) The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent
Model, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
[114] Lambsdorff, J. G. (2007). Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform. Cam-
bridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
[115] Lamo, A., J. Perez and L. Schuknecht (2007). ”The cyclicality of consumption, wages
and employment in the public sector in the Euro Area,” ECB Working paper Series 757,
May.
[116] Lamo, A., J. Perez and L. Schuknecht (2008). ”Public and Private Sector Wages:
Co-movement and Causality,” ECB WDN Working Paper Series 963, November.
[117] LaPalombara, J. (1994). ”Structural and Institutional Aspects of Corruption,” Social
Research, vol. 61, pp. 325-50.
[118] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silane, F., Shleifer, A.,Vishny, R.W. (1997). ”Trust in Large
Organizations,” American Economic Review, vol. 87(2), pp. 333-38.
[119] Leeper, E.M., Walker, T.B., and Yang, S. (2009). ”Government Investment and Fiscal
Stimulus in the Short and Long Run,” NBER Working Papers 15153, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc.
[120] Linnemann, Ludger (2009) ”Macroeconomic Effects of Shocks to Public Employment,”
Journal of Macroeconomics 31(2), 252-267.
[121] Little, W., Posada-Carbo, E. (eds) (1996). Political Corruption in Europe and Latin
America. MacMillan Press Ltd: London, UK.
[122] Lucas, R. (1990). ”Supply-side economics: an analytical review,” Oxford Economic
Papers, 42(2), 293-316.
[123] Makris, M. (2006) ”Political authority, expertise and government bureaucracies,” Pub-
lic Choice 127, pp. 275-292.
57
[124] Martinez-Mongay, C. (2000). ”ECFIN?s effective tax rates: Properties and compar-
isons with other tax indicators”’, Economic Paper no. 146, Brussels: European Commis-
sion, Directorate for Economic and Financial Affairs.
[125] Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., and Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic Theory.
Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.
[126] Mauro, P. (2004). ”The persistence of corruption and slow economic growth,” IMF
Staff Papers, 51, 1-18.
[127] McDaniel, Cara (2007) ”Average tax rates on consumption, invest-
ment, labor and capital in the OECD 1950-2003.” Available on-line at:
http://www.caramcdaniel.com/researchpapers. Retrieved on Aug.7, 2010.
[128] McDaniel, Cara (2009) Updated tax series OECD 1950-2009. Available on-line at at:
http://www.caramcdaniel.com/researchpapers. Retrieved on Aug.7, 2010.
[129] McKenzie, R. B., and Tullock, G. (1978) Modern Political Economy: An Introduction
to Economics. McGraw Hill, US.
[130] Mendoza, E.G., Razin A., and Tesar, L. (1994) ”Effective tax rates in macroeconomics:
Cross-country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption.” Journal of
Monetary Economics 34 (December): 297-323.
[131] Merz, M. (1995). ”Search in the labor market and the real business cycle,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 36(2), pp. 269-300.
[132] Mieczkowski, B. and Zinam, O. (1984). Bureaucracy, Ideology, Technology: Quality
of Life; East and West. Association for the Study of the nationalities (USSR and East
Europe) Inc: Charleston, US.
[133] Migue, J. L., and G. Belanger (1974) ”Toward a general theory of managerial discre-
tion,” Public Choice, 17, 27-43.
[134] Miller, G. J., and T. M. Moe (1983) ”Bureaucrats, legislators, and the size of govern-
ment,” American Political Science Review 77, 297-322.
[135] Mohtadi, H. and Roe, T. (1998). ”Growth, lobbying and public goods,” European
Journal of Political Economy, 14, 453-473.
58
[136] Mohtadi, H. and Roe, T. (2003). ”Democracy, rent-seeking, public spending and
growth,” Journal of Public Economics, 87, 445-466.
[137] Moe, T. M. (1997) ”The positive theory of public bureaucracy.” In: D. C. Mueller
(ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge University Press, pp. 455-480.
[138] Mueller, D. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
[139] Murphy, K., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1991). ”The Allocation of Talent: Implications
for Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 503-530.
[140] Murphy, K., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1993). ”Why is Rent Seeking So Costly to
Growth?,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 83, 409-414.
[141] Nash, J. (1953). ”Two-Person Cooperative Games,” Econometrica, vol 21(1), p. 128-
140.
[142] Niskanen, W. N. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Aldine-
Alberton Press: Chicago, US.
[143] Nitzan, S. (1994). ”Modeling rent-seeking contests,” European Journal of Political
Economy 10: 41-60.
[144] OECD (1982). Working in the public sector. Paris, France.
[145] OECD Statistical Database (2011). Available on-line at: stats.oecd.org. Accessed on
Aug.7, 2010.
[146] Ohanian, L. (1997). ”The macroeconomic effects of war finance in the United States:
World War II and the Korean war,” American Economic Review vol. 87(1), pp. 23-40.
[147] Park, H., Philippopoulos, A., Vassilatos, V. (2005) ”Choosing the size of the public
sector under rent seeking from state coffers.” European Journal of Political Economy 21,
830-850.
[148] Parkinson, C. Northcote (1957) Parkinson’s Law, or the Pursuit of Progress. John
Murray: London, Great Britain.
[149] Perez-Castrillo, J. D. and Verdier, T. (1992). ”A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking
Games,” Public Choice vol 73(3), pp. 335-50.
59
[150] Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy.
The MIT Press: London, UK.
[151] Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003). The Economic Effect of Constitutions. The MIT
Press: Cambridge, Mass.
[152] Perz-Castrillo, J.D. and Verdier, T. (1992). ”A general analysis of rent-seeking games,”
Public Choice 73: 335-350.
[153] Peter, L. J. and Hull, R. (1969). The Peter Principle: ”Every Employee Tends to Rise
to His Level of Incompetence.” Pan Books Ltd: London, UK.
[154] Posner, R.A. (1974). ”‘Theories of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics
and Management, Vol. 5(2), pp. 335-58.
[155] Posner, R.A. (1975). ”The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation,” Journal of Po-
litical Economy, vol. 83, pp. 807-27.
[156] Prendergast, C. (2002) ”The limits of bureaucratic efficiency,” Journal of Political
Economy, forthcoming.
[157] Riordan, R. (1999) Brazil: Politics in a patrimonial society. Praeger.
[158] Rodrick, D. (1999). ”Where did all the growth go? External shocks, social conflict and
growth collapses, Journal of Economic Growth, 4, 385-412.
[159] Rose-Akerman, S. (1978) Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. Academic Press:
London, UK.
[160] Rose-Akerman, S. (1999) Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and
Reform. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
[161] Reisman, D. (1990). The Political Economy of James Buchanan. MacMillan Press:
London, UK.
[162] Sargent, T. and Ljungqvist, L. (2004) Recursive Macroeconomic Theory 2nd ed. The
MIT Press: Mass., USA.
60
[163] Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M. (1997). ”Balanced-Budget Rules, Distortionary
Taxes, and Aggregate Instability,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 105, No. 5 (Oc-
tober), pp. 976-1000.
[164] Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M. (2004). ”Solving Dynamic General Equilibrium Mod-
els Using a Second Order Approximation to the policy function,” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 28, 755-775.
[165] Staaf, R. (1977). ”The Public School System in Transition: Do Teachers make a Dif-
ference?” In: Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Sources of Government Growth, Thomas E.
Borcherding (ed.). Duke University Press: Durham, North Carolina.
[166] Stockman, D. (2001). ”Balance-Budget Rules: Welfare Loss and Optimal Policies,”
Review of Economic Dynamics vol. 4, pp. 438-59.
[167] Tarschys, D. (1975) ”The Growth of Public Expenditures: Nine Models of Explana-
tion,” Scandinavian Political Studies 10: 9-31.
[168] Tinbergen, J. (1985). Production, Income and Welfare: The Search for an Optimal
Social Order. Harvester Press Group: Salisbury, UK.
[169] Tirole, J. (1996). ”A Theory of Collective Reputations (With Applications to the
Persistence of Corruption and the Firm Quality),” Review of Economic Studies, 63, 1-22.
[170] Tirole, J. (1994) ”The Internal Organization of Government,” Oxford Economic Papers,
46(1), pp. 1-29.
[171] Tullock, G. (1965). The Politics of Bureaucracy. Public Affairs Press: Washington,
D.C.
[172] Tullock, G. (1974) ”Dynamic Hypothesis on Bureaucracy,” Public Choice 19(1), pp.
127-131.
[173] Tullock, G. (1977). ”What is to be done?” In: Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Sources
of Government Growth, Thomas E. Borcherding (ed.). Duke University Press: Durham,
North Carolina.
[174] Tullock, G. (1980). ”Efficient rent-seeking,” in J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G.
Tullock, Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M University Press.
61
[175] von Mises, L. (1944). Bureaucracy. Yale University Press: New Haven, USA.
[176] Wallenius, J. and Prescott, E. C. (2011) ”Aggregate Labor Supply,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 457.
[177] Warwick, D. (1975). A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality and Orga-
nization in the State Department. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass.
[178] Weber, M. (1983) Capitalism, Bureaucracy and Religion George Allen and Urwin:
London, UK.
[179] Wildavsky, A. (1974) The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 2nd ed. Boston: Little,
Brown.
[180] Wilson, J. Q. (1989) Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do
It, Basic Books.
[181] Wintrobe, R. (1997) ”Modern Bureaucratic theory.” In: D. C. Mueller (ed.), Perspec-
tives on Public Choice, Cambridge University Press, pp. 429-454.
[182] World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Available on-line at:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. Accessed February 3, 2012.
[183] Zhu, X. (1992). ”Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Stochastic Growth Model,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 58, pp. 250-289.
62
11 Technical Appendix
11.1 Optimality Conditions
11.1.1 Firm’s Problem
The profit function is maximized when the derivatives of that function are set to zero.
Therefore, the optimal amount of capital - holding the level of technology At and labor input
Npt constant - is determined by setting the derivative of the profit function with respect to
Kpt equal to zero. This derivative is
(1− α)At(Npt )αK−αt − rt = 0 (11.1.1)
where (1− α)At(Npt )αK−αt − rt is the marginal product of capital because it expresses how
much output will increase if capital increases by one unit. The economic interpretation of
this First-Order Condition (FOC) is that in equilibrium, firms will rent capital up to the
point where the benefit of renting an additional unit of capital, which is the marginal product
of capital, equals the rental cost, i.e the interest rate.
rt = (1− α)At(Npt )αK−αt (11.1.2)
Now, multiply by Kpt and rearrange terms. This gives the following relationship:
Kt(1− α)At(Npt )αK−αt = rtKt or (1− α)Yt = rtKt (11.1.3)
because
Kt(1− α)At(Npt )αK−αt = (1− α)At(Npt )αK1−αt = (1− α)Yt (11.1.4)
To derive firms’ optimal labor demand, set the derivative of the profit function with respect
to the labor input equal to zero, holding technology and capital constant:
αAt(N
p
t )
α−1K1−αt − wpt = 0 or wpt = αAt(Npt )α−1K1−αt (11.1.5)
In equilibrium, firms will hire labor up to the point where the benefit of hiring an additional
hour of labor services, which is the marginal product of labor, equals the cost, i.e the hourly
wage rate.
Now multiply both sides of the equation by Npt and rearrange terms to yield
Npt αAt(N
p
t )
α−1K1−αt = w
p
tN
p
t or αYt = w
p
tN
p
t (11.1.6)
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Next, it will be shown that in equilibrium, economic profits are zero. Using the results above
one can obtain
Πt = Yt − rtKt − wptNpt = Yt − (1− θ)Yt − θYt = 0 (11.1.7)
Indeed, in equilibrium, economic profits are zero.
11.1.2 Consumer problem
Set up the Lagrangian
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
{
ψ1
C1−σct
1− σc + ψ2
[
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
]1−σl
1− σl + ψ3
(Sgt )
1−σs
1− σs
+Λt
[
(1− τ lt )(wptNpt + wgt
RSht
RSt
N ght ) + (1− τ kt )rtKpt +Gtt − Ct −Kpt+1 + (1− δ)Kpt
]}
(11.1.8)
This is a concave programming problem, so the FOCs, together with the additional, bound-
ary (”transversality”) conditions for private physical capital and government bonds are both
necessary and sufficient for an optimum.
To derive the FOCs, first take the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Ct (holding all other
variables unchanged) and set it to 0, i.e. LCt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
ψ1
(Ct)σc
− Λt
}
= 0 or
ψ1
(Ct)σc
= Λt (11.1.9)
This optimality condition equates marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of
wealth.
Now take the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Kpt+1 (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LKpt+1 = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− Λt + EtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)
]}
= 0 (11.1.10)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
−Λt + βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= 0 (11.1.11)
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Move Λt to the right so that
βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)
]
= Λt (11.1.12)
Using the expression for the real interest rate shifted one period forward one can obtain
rt+1 = (1− α) Yt+1
Kpt+1
βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)(1− α)
Yt+1
Kpt+1
+ (1− δp)
]
= Λt (11.1.13)
This is the Euler equation, which determines how consumption is allocated across periods.
Take now the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Npt (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LNpt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− ψ2
[1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N gt −RSht − γ(N ght )2]σl
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wpt
}
= 0 (11.1.14)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
− ψ2
[1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − ϕ(N ght )2]σl
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wpt = 0 (11.1.15)
Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2
[1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − ϕ(N ght )2]σl
= Λt(1− τ lt )wpt (11.1.16)
Plug in the expression for wht , that is,
wpt = α
Yt
Npt
(11.1.17)
into the equation above. Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2
[1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − ϕ(N ght )2]σl
+ Λt(1− τ lt )θ
Yt
Npt
(11.1.18)
Take now the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t N gt (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LNgt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− ψ2(1 + 2ϕN
gh
t )
[1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − ϕ(N ght )2]σl
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
RSht
RSt
}
= 0(11.1.19)
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Cancel the βt term to obtain
− ψ2(1 + 2ϕN
gh
t )
[1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − ϕ(N ght )2]σl
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
RSht
RSt
= 0 (11.1.20)
Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2(1 + 2ϕN
gh
t )
[1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − ϕ(N ght )2]σl
= Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
RSht
RSt
(11.1.21)
Take now the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t RSht (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LNght = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− ψ2(1 +
Nght
RSt
)
[1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − ϕ(N ght )2]σl
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
N ght
RSt
}
= 0(11.1.22)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
− ψ2(1 +
Nght
RSt
)
[1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − ϕ(N ght )2]σl
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
N ght
RSt
= 0 (11.1.23)
Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2(1 +
Nght
RSt
)
[1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − ϕ(N ght )2]σl
= Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
N ght
RSt
(11.1.24)
Lastly, a transversality condition need to be imposed to prevent Ponzi schemes, i.e borrowing
bigger and bigger amounts every subsequent period and never paying it off.
lim
t→∞
βtΛtK
p
t+1 = 0 (11.1.25)
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11.2 Per capita stationary symmetric DCE
Since the model in stationary and per capita terms by definition, there is no need to transform
the optimality conditions, but only impose symmetry i.e. Zht = Zt = zt. Thus, the system
of equations that describes the DCE is as follows:
yt = at(k
p
t )
1−α(npt )
α (11.2.1)
yt = ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δp)kpt + git (11.2.2)
ψ1
(ct)σc
= λt (11.2.3)
λt = βEtλt+1
[
1− δp + (1− τ k)(1− α)yt+1
kpt+1
]
(11.2.4)
ψ2
[1− npt − ngt − rst − ϕ(ngt )2]σl
=
ψ1
(ct)σc
(1− τ l)α yt
npt
(11.2.5)
ψ2
[1− npt − ngt − rst − ϕ(ngt )2]σl
[1 + 2γngt ] =
ψ1
(ct)σc
(1− τ l)wgt (11.2.6)
kpt+1 = it + (1− δp)kpt (11.2.7)
rt = (1− α) yt
kpt
(11.2.8)
wpt = α
yt
npt
(11.2.9)
gtt + g
i
t + w
g
tn
g
t = τ
krtk
p
t + τ
l
[
wptn
p
t + w
g
tn
g
t
]
. (11.2.10)
kgt+1 = g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt (11.2.11)
git = g
iy
t yt (11.2.12)
rst = n
g
t
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
(11.2.13)
sgt = (n
g
t )
γ(kgt )
1−γ (11.2.14)
Therefore, the DCE is summarized by Equations (13.1.1)-(13.1.14) in the paths of the follow-
ing 14 variables {yt, ct, it, kpt , kgt , git, rst, npt , ngt , sgt , wpt , wgt , rt, λt}∞t=0 given the process followed
by total factor productivity {at}∞t=0, the values of government investment shares giy, the fixed
level of government transfers gt and capital and labor tax rates {τ k, τ l}.
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11.3 Steady-state
In steady-state, there is no uncertainty and variables do not change. Thus, eliminate all
stochasticity and time subscripts to obtain
y = a(kp)1−α(np)α (11.3.1)
y = c+ δpkp + gi (11.3.2)
ψ1
(c)σc
= λ (11.3.3)
1 = β
[
1− δp + (1− τ k)(1− α) y
kp
]
(11.3.4)
ψ2
[1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2]σl =
ψ1
(c)σc
(1− τ l)θ y
np
(11.3.5)
ψ2
[1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2]σl [1 + 2ϕn
g] =
ψ1
(c)σc
(1− τ l)wg (11.3.6)
ip = δpkp (11.3.7)
r = (1− α) y
kp
(11.3.8)
wp = α
y
np
(11.3.9)
gt + gi + wgng = τ krkp + τ l
[
wpnp + wgng
]
. (11.3.10)
gi = δgkg (11.3.11)
gi = giyy (11.3.12)
rs = ng
[
wg
wp
− 1
]
(11.3.13)
sg = (ng)γ(kg)1−γ (11.3.14)
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11.3.1 Cooperative solution
This subsection compares the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium solution to a case where
all households coordinate on the first-best solution for rent-seeking. In particular, in every
period, before choosing allocations, all households meet and discuss the possibility of engag-
ing in rent-seeking activities. Throughout the discussion, they realize that if rent-seeking,
they bargain again themselves, and thus agree not to rent-seek, as that would be jointly
socially optimal outcome. Indeed, such a pre-communication results in sizable welfare gains,
as shown in Table 7 on the next page. Aside from some slight differences in hours, there are
no significant differences between the allocations in the tho equilibria. Note also that the
transaction cost parameter in the cooperative solution is slightly lower.
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Table 6: Data averages and long-run solution: non-cooperative vs. cooperative equilibrium
Description GE Data Non-cooperative Cooperative
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.590 0.784 0.784
i/y Private investment-to-output ratio 0.210 0.192 0.192
gi/y Public investment-to-output ratio 0.023 0.023 0.023
kp/y Private capital-to-output ratio 2.350 2.346 2.346
kg/y Public capital-to-output ratio 0.630 0.630 0.630
sg/y Public services-to-output ratio 0.193 0.225 0.225
gt/y 0.170 0.228 0.228
wpnp/y Private labor share in output 0.710 0.710 0.710
wgng/y Public wage bill share in output 0.130 0.145 0.145
rk/y Private capital share in output 0.290 0.290 0.290
wg/wp Public/Private wage ratio 1.200 1.200 1.200
wp Private sector wage rate - 1.006 1.006
wg Public sector wage rate - 1.207 1.207
w˜p After-tax private wage rate - 0.595 0.595
w˜g After-tax public wage rate - 0.714 0.714
n Total employment 0.296 0.296 0.300
np Private employment level 0.253 0.253 0.256
ng Public employment level 0.043 0.043 0.044
rs Rent-seeking time - 0.009 0.000
ng/np Public/private employment ratio 0.170 0.170 0.170
r¯ After-tax net return to capital 0.036 0.035 0.035
ϕ Transaction cost parameter - 2.318 2.298
U Total discounted welfare - 95.02 95.42
ξ Welfare gain - 0 0.025
11.3.2 Wage equalization across sectors
The second special case is when the government sets equal wages across sectors, and thus
eliminates rent-seeking. This is still a non-cooperative Nash solution, in which transaction
costs from working in the government are no longer present, as γ = 0 (there is no public
70
wage premium). Again, as seen in Table 8, with the exception of hours, there are no other
differences in steady-state allocations across equilibria. Still, the welfare gains of setting
wages equal across sectors brings substantial gains in the exogenous policy case.
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Table 7: Data averages and long-run solution: non-cooperative vs. cooperative equilibrium
Description GE Data Non-cooperative Cooperative
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.590 0.784 0.784
i/y Private investment-to-output ratio 0.210 0.192 0.192
gi/y Public investment-to-output ratio 0.023 0.023 0.023
kp/y Private capital-to-output ratio 2.350 2.346 2.346
kg/y Public capital-to-output ratio 0.630 0.630 0.630
sg/y Public services-to-output ratio 0.193 0.225 0.225
gt/y 0.170 0.228 0.242
wpnp/y Private labor share in output 0.710 0.710 0.710
wgng/y Public wage bill share in output 0.130 0.145 0.121
rk/y Private capital share in output 0.290 0.290 0.290
wg/wp Public/Private wage ratio 1.200 1.200 1.000
wp Private sector wage rate - 1.006 1.006
wg Public sector wage rate - 1.207 1.006
w˜p After-tax private wage rate - 0.595 0.595
w˜g After-tax public wage rate - 0.714 0.595
n Total employment 0.296 0.296 0.301
np Private employment level 0.253 0.253 0.257
ng Public employment level 0.043 0.043 0.044
rs Rent-seeking time - 0.009 0.000
ng/np Public/private employment ratio 0.170 0.170 0.170
r¯ After-tax net return to capital 0.036 0.035 0.035
ϕ Transaction cost parameter - 2.318 0.000
U Total discounted welfare - 95.02 95.82
ξ Welfare gain - 0 0.052
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11.4 Appendix: Data description
ICRG: The ICRG index is based on annual values for indicators of the quality of gover-
nance, corruption and violation of property rights over the period 1982-1997. It has been
constructed by Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center, University of Maryland, from monthly
ICRG data provided by Political Risk Services. This index takes values within the range
0-50, with higher values indicating better institutional quality. The reported numbers are
the averages over 1982-1997, and are taken from Angelopoulos et al. (2009). Knack and
Keefer (1995) explain in detail the how the index was constructed.
Control of corruption index: Control of Corruption index measures perceptions of the
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The
index is obtained from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The units
in which the control of corruption is measured follow a normal distribution with a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. This implies that virtually all scores lie
between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. The values are
averaged over the 1996-2009 period.
Quality of Public Finances (Size of government, Public Administration, Gov-
ernment expenditure effectiveness): The Quality of Public Finances (QPF) composite
index is composed of sub-indices which distinguish between five dimensions through which
public finances can impact long-term economic growth drawing on the theoretical and em-
pirical literature on the links between public finances and long-term economic growth. The
dimensions considered in this paper are: (i) the size of government (dimension QPF 1),(ii)
the composition, efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure (dimension QPF 3), and (iv) the
structure and efficiency of the public administration (dimension QPF 4) QPF is defined as
all fiscal policy arrangements and operations that support achieving macroeconomic goals of
fiscal policy, in particular long-term economic growth. Scores range from -30 to +30 with an
EU-15 average of 0. Assuming a normal distribution a value between -10 and -30 is deemed
as very poor, between -4 and -10 as poor, between -4 and +4 as average, between +4 and
+10 as good, and between +10 and +30 as very good. Scores were calculated using linear
unweighted average. More information on the index is contained in the European Commis-
sion (2009) report.
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Government effectiveness index: The scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5 (distributed accord-
ing to a standard normal distribution), with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
In ”Government Effectiveness” category the quality of public service provision, the quality
of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service
from political pressures, and the credibility of the governments commitment to policies is
combined to one index. The main focus of this index is on ”inputs” required for the gov-
ernment to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods. The
values are averaged over the 1996-2009 period.
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11.5 Log-linearization
11.5.1 Log-linearized production function
yt = at(k
p
t )
1−α(npt )
α (11.5.1)
Take natural logs from both sides to obtain
ln yt = ln at + (1− α) ln kpt + α lnnpt (11.5.2)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln yt
dt
=
d ln at
dt
+ (1− α)d ln k
p
t
dt
+ α
d lnnpt
dt
(11.5.3)
1
y
dyt
dt
=
1
a
dat
dt
+
1− α
kp
dkt
dt
+
α
np
dnpt
dt
(11.5.4)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
0 = −yˆt + (1− α)kˆpt + aˆt + αnˆpt (11.5.5)
11.5.2 Linearized market clearing
ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δ)kpt + git = yt (11.5.6)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
ln[ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δ)kpt + git] = ln(yt) (11.5.7)
Totally differentiate with respect to time
d ln[ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δ)kpt + git]
dt
= d ln(yt) (11.5.8)
1
c+ δkp + gc
[
dct
dt
c
c
+
dkpt+1
dt
kp
kp
− (1− δp)dk
p
t
dt
kp
kp
+
dgit
dt
gi
gi
]
=
dyt
dt
1
y
(11.5.9)
Define zˆ = dzt
dt
1
z
. Thus passing to log-deviations
1
y
[
cˆtc+ kˆ
p
t+1k
p − (1− δp)kˆpt kp + gigˆit
]
= yˆt (11.5.10)
cˆtc+ kˆ
p
t+1k
p − (1− δp)kˆpt kp + gigˆit = yyˆt (11.5.11)
kpkˆpt+1 = yyˆt − ccˆt + (1− δ)kpkˆpt − gigˆit (11.5.12)
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11.5.3 Linearized FOC consumption
ψ1
ct
= λt (11.5.13)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
lnψ1 − ln(ct) = lnλt (11.5.14)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnψ1
dt
− d ln ct
dt
=
d lnλt
dt
(11.5.15)
or
−d ln ct
dt
=
d lnλt
dt
(11.5.16)
−dct
dt
1
c
=
dλt
dt
1
λ
(11.5.17)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
−cˆt = λˆt (11.5.18)
11.5.4 Linearized no-arbitrage condition for capital
λt = βEtλt+1[(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)] (11.5.19)
Substitute out rt+1 on the right hand side of the equation to obtain
λt = βEt[λt+1((1− τ kt+1)(1− α)
yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)] (11.5.20)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnλt = lnEt[λt+1((1− τ kt+1)(1− α)
yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)] (11.5.21)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnλt
dt
=
d lnEt[λt+1((1− τ kt+1)(1− α) yt+1kpt+1 + (1− δ
p)]
dt
(11.5.22)
76
1λ
dλt
dt
= Et
{
1
λ((1− τ kt+1)(1− α) ykp + 1− δp
[
((1− τ k)(1− α) y
kp
+ 1− δp)dλt+1
dt
λ
λ
+
λ(1− τ k)(1− α)
kp
dyt+1
dt
y
y
−
[
λ(1− τ k)(1− α)y
(kp)2
]
dkpt+1
dt
kp
kp
]}
(11.5.23)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
λˆt = Et
{
λˆt+1 +
[
(1− τ k)(1− α)y
((1− τ k)(1− α) yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)kp yˆt+1
− (1− τ
k)(1− α)y
((1− α) yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)kp kˆ
p
t+1
]}
(11.5.24)
Observe that
(1− τ k)(1− α) y
kp
+ 1− δp = 1/β (11.5.25)
Plug it into the equation to obtain
λˆt = Et
[
λˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− α)y
kp
yˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− α)y
kp
kˆpt+1
]
(11.5.26)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− α)y
kp
Etyˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− α)y
kp
Etkˆ
p
t+1 (11.5.27)
11.5.5 Linearized MRS(ct, n
p
t )
ψ2ct = ψ1[1− npt − rst − ngt − ϕ(nt)2](1− τ l)α
yt
npt
(11.5.28)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnψ2ct = lnψ1[1− npt − ngt − rst − ϕ(nt)2](1− τ l)α
yt
npt
(11.5.29)
lnψ2 + ln ct = lnψ1 + ln[1− npt − ngt − rst − ϕ(nt)2]
+ ln(1− τ lt ) + ln yt − lnnpt (11.5.30)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnψ2
dt
+
d ln ct
dt
=
d lnψ1
dt
+
d ln[1− npt − ngt − rst − ϕ(nt)2]
dt
+
d ln(1− τ lt )
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(11.5.31)
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1c
[
dct
dt
]
= − 1
1− np − ng − rst − ϕ(ng)2
d
[
npt + n
g
t + rst + ϕ(nt)
2
]
dt
−dτ
l
t
dt
1
1− τ l +
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(11.5.32)
dct
dt
1
c
= − n
p
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2
dnpt
dt
1
np
− rs
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2
drst
dt
1
rs
− n
g(1 + 2ϕng)
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2
dngt
dt
1
ng
− τ
l
1− τ l
dτ lt
dt
1
τ l
+
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(11.5.33)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
cˆt = − n
p
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
rs
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 rˆst
− n
g(1 + 2ϕng)
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t + yˆt − nˆpt (11.5.34)
Group terms to obtain
cˆt = − 1− n
g − ϕ(ng)2
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t
− rs
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 rˆst −
ng(1 + 2ϕng)
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t + yˆt(11.5.35)
11.5.6 Linearized MRS(ct, n
g
t )
ψ2ct = ψ1[1− npt − ngt − rst − ϕ(nt)2](1− τ l)wgt (11.5.36)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnψ2ct = lnψ1[1− npt − ngt − rst − ϕ(nt)2](1− τ l)wgt (11.5.37)
lnψ2 + ln ct = lnψ1 + ln[1− npt − ngt − rst − ϕ(nt)2] + ln(1− τ lt ) + lnwgt(11.5.38)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnψ2
dt
+
d ln ct
dt
=
d lnψ1
dt
+
d ln[1− npt − ngt − rst − ϕ(nt)2]
dt
+
d ln(1− τ lt )
dt
+
d lnwgt
dt
(11.5.39)
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1c
[
dct
dt
]
= − 1
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2
d
[
npt + n
g
t + rst + ϕ(nt)
2
]
dt
−dτ
l
t
dt
1
1− τ l +
dwgt
dt
1
wg
(11.5.40)
dct
dt
1
c
= − n
p
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2
dnpt
dt
1
np
− rs
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2
drst
dt
1
rs
− n
g(1 + 2ϕng)
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2
dngt
dt
1
ng
− τ
l
1− τ l
dτ lt
dt
1
τ l
+
1
wg
dwgt
dt
(11.5.41)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
cˆt = − n
p
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
rs
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 rˆst
− n
g(1 + 2ϕng)
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t + wˆ
g
t (11.5.42)
11.5.7 Linearized private physical capital accumulation
kpt+1 = it + (1− δp)kpt (11.5.43)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
ln kpt+1 = ln(it + (1− δp)kpt ) (11.5.44)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln kpt+1
dt
=
1
i+ (1− δ)kp
d(it + (1− δp)kpt )
dt
(11.5.45)
Observe that since
i = δpkp, it follows that i+ (1− δp)kp = δpkp + (1− δp)kp = kp. Then (11.5.46)
dkpt+1
dt
1
kp
=
1
kp
dit
dt
i
i
+
kp
i+ (1− δp)kpt
dkpt
dt
kp
kp
(11.5.47)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
kˆpt+1 =
δpkp
kp
iˆt +
(1− δp)kp
kp
kˆpt (11.5.48)
kˆpt+1 = δ
piˆt + (1− δp)kˆpt (11.5.49)
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11.5.8 Linearized government physical capital accumulation
kgt+1 = g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt (11.5.50)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
ln kgt+1 = ln(g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt ) (11.5.51)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln kgt+1
dt
=
1
gi + (1− δg)kg
d(it + (1− δg)kgt )
dt
(11.5.52)
Observe that since
gi = δgkg, it follows that gi + (1− δg)kg = δgkg + (1− δg)kg = kg. Then (11.5.53)
dkgt+1
dt
1
kg
=
1
kg
dgit
dt
gi
gi
+
kg
i + (1− δg)kgt
dkgt
dt
kg
kg
(11.5.54)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
kˆgt+1 =
δgkg
kg
gˆit +
(1− δp)kg
kg
kˆgt (11.5.55)
kˆgt+1 = δ
ggˆit + (1− δg)kˆgt (11.5.56)
11.5.9 Linearized government budget constraint
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git = τ kt rtkt + τ ltwptnpt . (11.5.57)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
= ln
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
. (11.5.58)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d
dt
ln
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
=
d
dt
ln
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
. (11.5.59)
or
1
(1− τ l)wgng + gi
d
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
dt
=
1[
τ krk + τ lwpnp
] d
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
dt
.(11.5.60)
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Note that
(1− τ l)wgng + gi = τ krk + τ lwpnp (11.5.61)
Hence
d
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
dt
=
d
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
dt
. (11.5.62)
or
−wgng dτ
l
t
dt
τ l
τ l
+ (1− τ l)ng dw
g
t
dt
wg
wg
+ (1− τ l)wg dn
g
t
dt
ng
ng
+
dgit
dt
gi
gi
= rk
dτ kt
dt
τ k
τ k
+ τ kk
drt
dt
r
r
+ τ kr
dkt
dt
k
k
+ wpnp
dτ lt
dt
+ τ lnp
dwpt
dt
wp
wp
+ τ lwp
dnpt
dt
np
np
(11.5.63)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
−τ lwgng τˆ lt + (1− τ l)wgngwˆgt + (1− τ l)wgngnˆgt + gigˆit
= τ krkτˆ kt + τ
krkrˆt + τ
krkkˆt + τ
lwpnpτˆ lt + τ
lwpnpwˆpt + τ
lwpnpnˆpt (11.5.64)
11.5.10 Total hours/employment
nt = n
g
t + n
p
t (11.5.65)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
lnnt = ln(n
g
t + n
p
t ) (11.5.66)
Totally differentiate to obtain
d lnnt
dt
=
d ln(ngt + n
p
t )
dt
(11.5.67)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
(
dngt
dt
+
dnpt
dt
)
1
n
(11.5.68)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
(
dngt
dt
ng
ng
+
dnpt
dt
np
np
)
1
n
(11.5.69)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
dngt
dt
1
ng
ng
n
+
dnpt
dt
1
np
np
n
(11.5.70)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
nˆt =
ng
n
nˆgt +
np
n
nˆpt (11.5.71)
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11.5.11 Linearized private wage rate
wpt = α
yt
npt
(11.5.72)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
lnwpt = lnα + ln yt − lnnpt (11.5.73)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnwpt
dt
=
d lnα
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(11.5.74)
Simplify to obtain
dwpt
dt
1
wp
=
dyt
dt
1
y
− dn
p
t
dt
1
np
(11.5.75)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
wˆpt = yˆt − nˆpt (11.5.76)
11.5.12 Linearized real interest rate
rt = α
yt
kpt
(11.5.77)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln rt = lnα + ln yt − ln kpt (11.5.78)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln rt
dt
=
d lnα
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d ln k
p
t
dt
(11.5.79)
Simplify to obtain
dr
dt
1
r
=
dyt
dt
1
y
− dk
p
t
dt
1
kp
(11.5.80)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
rˆt = yˆt − kˆpt (11.5.81)
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11.5.13 Linearized government investment
git = g
iyyt (11.5.82)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln git = ln g
iy + ln yt (11.5.83)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln git
dt
=
d ln giy
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
(11.5.84)
or
dgit
dt
1
gi
=
dyt
dt
1
y
(11.5.85)
Passing to log-deviations
gˆit = yˆt (11.5.86)
11.5.14 Linearized government services
sgt = (n
g
t )
γ(kgt )
(1−γ) (11.5.87)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln sgt = γ lnn
g
t + (1− γ) ln kgt (11.5.88)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
dsgt
dt
1
sg
= γ
dngt
dt
1
ng
+ (1− γ)dk
g
t
dt
1
kg
(11.5.89)
sˆgt = γnˆ
g
t + (1− γ)kˆgt (11.5.90)
11.5.15 Linearized rent-seeking rule
rst = n
g
t
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
(11.5.91)
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Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln rst = lnn
g
t + ln
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
(11.5.92)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln rst
dt
=
d lnngt
dt
+
d
dt
ln
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
(11.5.93)
drst
dt
1
rs
=
dngt
dt
1
ng
+
d
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
dt
1[
wg
wp
− 1
] (11.5.94)
rˆst = nˆ
g
t + wˆ
g
t
wg
wp
ng
rs
+ wˆpt
ng
rs
(wg − 2) (11.5.95)
11.5.16 Linearized technology shock process
ln at+1 = ρ
a ln at + 
a
t+1 (11.5.96)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln at+1
dt
= ρa
d ln at
dt
+
dat+1
dt
(11.5.97)
dat+1
dt
= ρa
dat
dt
+ at+1 (11.5.98)
where for t = 1
dat+1
dt
≈ ln(eat+1/ea) = at+1 − a = at+1 since a = 0. Pass to log-deviations
to obtain
aˆt+1 = ρ
aaˆt + 
a
t+1 (11.5.99)
11.6 Log-linearized DCE system
0 = −yˆt + (1− α)kˆpt + aˆt + αnˆpt (11.6.1)
kpkˆpt+1 = yyˆt − ccˆt + (1− δp)kpkˆpt − gigˆit (11.6.2)
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−cˆt = λˆt (11.6.3)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− α)y
kp
Etyˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− α)y
kp
Etkˆ
p
t+1 (11.6.4)
cˆt = − 1− n
g − ϕ(ng)2
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
rs
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 rˆst
− n
g(1 + 2ϕng)
1− np − ng − ϕ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t + yˆt (11.6.5)
cˆt = − n
p
1− np − rs− ng − ϕ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
rs
1− np − rs− ng − ϕ(ng)2 rˆst
− n
g(1 + 2ϕng)
1− np − ng − rs− ϕ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t + wˆ
g
t (11.6.6)
kˆpt+1 = δ
piˆt + (1− δp)kˆpt (11.6.7)
kˆgt+1 = δ
ggˆit + (1− δg)kˆgt (11.6.8)
−τ lwgng τˆ lt + (1− τ l)wgngwˆgt + (1− τ l)wgngnˆgt + gigˆit
= τ krkτˆ kt + τ
krkrˆt + τ
krkkˆt + τ
lwpnpτˆ lt + τ
lwpnpwˆpt + τ
lwpnpnˆpt (11.6.9)
gˆit = yˆt (11.6.10)
rˆst = nˆ
g
t + wˆ
g
t
wg
wp
ng
rs
+ wˆpt
ng
rs
(wg − 2) (11.6.11)
wˆpt = yˆt − nˆpt (11.6.12)
rˆt = yˆt − kˆpt (11.6.13)
sˆgt = γnˆ
g
t + (1− γ)kˆgt (11.6.14)
aˆt+1 = ρ
aaˆt + 
a
t+1 (11.6.15)
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The model can be now solved by representing it in the following matrix form
AEt+1xˆt = Bxˆt + Cεt, (11.6.16)
where A,B,C are coefficient matrices, εt is a matrix of innovations, and xˆt is the stacked
vector of state (also called ’predetermined’) variables, sˆt =
[
aˆt kˆ
p
t kˆ
g
t
]′
, and control vari-
ables, zˆt =
[
yˆt cˆt iˆt nˆt nˆ
p
t nˆ
g
t wˆ
p
t wˆ
g
t λˆt rˆst gˆ
i
t sˆ
g
t
]′
. Klein’s (2000) generalized
eigenvalue (”Schur”) decomposition algorithm was used to solve the model. The MATLAB
function to solve the above linear system is solab.m. The inputs are matrices A,B,C defined
above and nk = 3, which is the number of state variables. The outputs are the coefficient
matrices M and Π which solve the linearized system. A solution to an RBC model is in the
form of (approximate) policy, or transition rule, which describes the evolution of each vari-
able. In particular, the predetermined and non-predetermined variables can be represented
in the following form:
Etsˆt+1 = Πsˆt (11.6.17)
zˆt = M sˆt (11.6.18)
To simulate the model, one requires a sequence of normally distributed disturbances, {t}∞t=0
for the three exogenous shocks with sample size T , the initial values of the endogenous
predetermined variables, {kp0, kg0 , a0} (a0 = 1), and the evolution of the endogenous non-
predetermined variables in model solution form
sˆt+1 = Πsˆt + Dεt+1 (11.6.19)
zˆt = Msˆt, (11.6.20)
where
D =

1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
 (11.6.21)
Based on the above representation, MATLAB code was written to simulate the model. The
computation of impulse responses using the linearized model solution is straightforward.
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